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A STUDY OF THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE
IN THE UNITED STATES
Since the United States has become engaged in a second
world war, a great many of our customs and activities
have been set aside or pushed into the background due to
the all out effort to win the war. Some of these customs will
be greatly changed when we finally gain victory. All of our
pre-war activities will have felt the shock of this earth-rocking conflict. Not only will our social and economic institutions be changed or modified, but our political ideas and
aims will be pointed in new directions. This latter institution,, namely, our political party system, will probably be
one of the greatest post-war influences on all other institutions. For it is through political activity that the people give
life and effect to their new ideas.
Many of our young people who have gone into this conflict with hazy ideas of what they want from their government, or what their government should do, have learned from
bitter reality the heritage of free men. They have found that
in order to gain a better life, a free, peace-loving world, they
must take an active, positive part in the governmental affairs
of their countries. In some of the countries of this world,
this task is difficult since the people are not given a hand or
a voice in the affairs of state. Many people on this earth do
not have a thing to say as to who is to rule them or to put
into practice the desirable and needed policies to preserve
the better world which they are now fighting to obtain.
These people will be in a rather sad situation since they cannot find a positive way to exercise their will in order to gain
their ideals of a better world.
However, the young people of the United States are in a
much different position. They have fought to preserve a
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heritage of freedom. They were born free, fought as free
men, and now they have within their power, if they choose
to exercise it, the means of seeing that their new found ideas
of social and economic benefit will be carried into effect. For
in the United States, the people choose their governmental
officers and their representatives who can carry out the
principles for which the people have fought and died to gain.
This means, which gives the people of the United States an
opportunity to shape their own destinies, is the privilege of
voting.
Through the elective franchise the citizens of the United
States as citizens of each of the states make themselves felt.
This brings forth the important feature of dual citizenship
which we have in this country. A person "born or naturalized
in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" 1
is a citizen of the United States and also of the state where
he lives. Since we have two sovereignties in this country, it
must be remembered that the people are citizens of both the
United States and the separate states.2 Thus the responsibility of each citizen is twofold. He must, therefore, accept
the responsibility and exercise his elective franchise as he
has never done before in order to gain his new ideals.
In the past non-voting has been famous in the United
States. In some of our past Presidential elections as high as
eighty percent of the eligible voters have voted, but in other
state and local elections a much lower number has participated. Some people have suggested compulsory voting like
that used in some of the foreign countries be instituted'here.
However, the idea of compelling people to vote is repugnant
to the American ideals of freedom and democracy. The solution to non-voting does not lie in compulsion; it lies in the
intelligent education of our people as to the innate power
they possess through their privilege of elections. For an
1 United States Constitution, Art. 14, Sec. 1.
2 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 73; 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873). Also see U. S.
Western Mutual Fire Ins, Co. v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 42 F. Supp. 1007 (1941).
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election, broadly defined, means an expression of a choice for
candidates by the voters of a body politic.'
Therefore, it is desirable, to examine this almost sacred
privilege of voting and see the position of the electors in the
American form of "government of the people, by the people,
and for the people." I
In order to facilitate a study of this important privilege,
a definite plan will be followed. There is some necessary
overlapping of subject-matter in the following divisions, but
this can not be helped since there can be no natural subdivision of such a composite function. Any division will be at
best an arbitrary separation in order to explain certain features of the elective franchise. Thus the following eight divisions will be discussed:
1. The Constitutional Provisions.
2. The Elector.
3. The Electors' Qualifications.
4. Political Parties and Primary Elections.
5. Corrupt Practice Acts.
6. Secrecy of Voting.
7. Absentee Voting and Voting by Persons in Military
Service.
8. Federal Soldiers' Vote Act.
I
CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS.

Perhaps the first place to start in examining the elective
franchise in the United States is to search the Federal Constitution. For in the case of Taylor v. Beckham ' it was observed that the elective system in the United States is not of
3 See State v. Hirsch, 125 Ind. 207, 24 N. E. 1062 (1890) and Maynard v.
Board of Canvassers, 84 Mich. 228, 47 N. W. 756 (1890).
4 Lincoln's Gettysburg Address.
5 172 U. S. 548, 44 L. Ed. 1187 (1900).
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common law origin, but it is purely a matter of constitutional
and statutory provisions. The right to vote is governed by
the constitutions and statutes of the respective states bounded by the limitations and grants contained in the Federal
Constitution.'
The first appropriate section which draws our attention
is Article I, Section 2. It provides that "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every
second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for
election of the most numerous branch of the state legislatures."
This section provides in effect that whatever the respective states have established as qualifications for electors for
elections of their legislatures, the same electors shall be
deemed to be electors for the House of Representatives in
the Federal Government.7
The next important section is Article I, Section 4. It provides that "The time, place, and manner of holding elections
for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each
State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by law make or alter such regulation, except as to
the place of choosing Senators." Thus each state may make
the necessary laws through its legislature which shall govern
the time, place and manner of holding Congressional elections. However, in Ex Parte Yarbrougk 8 the Supreme Court
held that it is in the power of Congress to pr6vide laws for
the proper conduct of elections held for congressmen; to provide, if necessary, the officers who shall conduct them and
6 It should be noted that since many of the constitutional questions raised
under -these specific provisions are decided in cases under specific topics, many of

the cases will be discussed under, the individual topic rather than here under the
general constitutional provision.
7 See Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 663, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1884).
8 110 U. S. 661, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1884).
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make returns of the results; and to provide for elections held
under its authority; and for the security of the voter while
voting.
The next appropriate section is Article 2, Section 1. It
provides for the election of the President and the Vice-President and "each state shall appoint in such manner as the
legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors equal
to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to
which the state may be entitled in Congress." It further
provides for the working of the Electoral College. This section of the Constitution was superseded by the 12th Amendment to the Constitution which changes the electoral college
system, to the extent of having the electors meet in the states
and then in case of no majority for the President or VicePresident being attained, the House of Representatives and
the Senate respectively choosing the President and the VicePresident from the two highest numbers on the list.
Article 14, Section 1, is the next important section to examine. It provides that "All persons born or naturalized in
the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privilege and immunities of citizens of the
United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."

Section 2

"*

* * But when the right to vote at any

election for the choice of election for President and VicePresident of the United States, Representatives in Congress,
the Executive and Judicial officers of a state, or the members of the Legislatures thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and
a citizen of the United States, or in any way abridged * * *
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall
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bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years
of age in such state."
This amendment gives added views as to the idea of dual
citizenship. It recognizes 'both United States and state citizenship existing simultaneously. 9 This amendment recognizes the qualification of twenty-one years of age and citizenship of the United States as part of the requirements for
voting for Federal officers. It denies the states' right to prevent male citizens the right to vote if they are twenty-one
years of age and are citizens of the United States. This
amendment does not prescribe the qualifications for voters,
nor does it grant the right to vote to the above mentioned
males. It merely provides a penalty for the states that discriminate against any male inhabitants who are qualified.
This amendment does not supersede the states' lists of qualifications for electors within their boundaries for state officers; and since the qualifications prescribed by the state for
the election of its legislators are used for requisites for the
eligibility of electors for Federal officers, this amendment
does not change the states' power of defining qualifications.
For example, in Spencer v. Board of Registration10 the
court held that to make a person a citizen is not to make him
or her a voter. All that has been accomplished by the amendment was to advance such person to full citizenship and
clothe him with the capacity to become a voter. The court
of California in Van Valkenburg v. Brown11 held that the
right to vote is not one of the privileges and immunities of a
citizen protected by this amendment.
Article 15, Section 1, is extremely important in that it provides that "the right of a citizen of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any state on account of race, color or previous condition of
servitude."
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 73, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873).
10 1 MacArthur D. C. 169 (1873). See also Gouger v. Timberlake, 148 Ind. 38;
46 N. E. 339 (1897).
11 46 Cal. 52 (1872).
9
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In construing this amendment the court in Lackey v.
United States12 held that this amendment does not confer
the right of suffrage upon any one, nor does it secure or guarantee any right of suffrage to any class of citizens. It has the
effect of prohibiting discrimination in the United States "on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
Then in United States v. Cruikshank "8the Supreme Court
held that the right to vote in the states comes from the
states; the right of exemption from prohibited discrimination comes from the United States. The first has not been
granted by the 15th amendment, but the prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of race, color or previous condition of servitude has been.
As to the effect of the 15th Amendment, the court in Neal
v. Delaware "4held that the adoption of this amendment had
the effect in law of removing from the state constitutions or
at least rendering inoperative, provisions which restricted
the right of suffrage to the white race.
Applying the prohibitive provisions of the 15th Amendment in the famous case of Nixon v. Herndon "5the Supreme
Court held that where a state statute was passed which prohibited negroes from participating in party primary elections, the state statute was clearly a violation of this amendment. The state cannot pass an act which discriminates
against a citizen of the United States, otherwise qualified to
vote, which denies or abridges that citizens' right to vote because of the "color, race, or previous condition of servitude"
of that citizen.
Then in Quinn v. United States 16 the court was called
upon to decide the constitutionality of the so-called "grand12

107 F. 114 (1901), certiorari denied in 181 U. S. 621, 45 L. Ed. 10, 1032

(1901).
13 92 U. S. 555, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1876). See also Guinn v. United States, 238
U. S. 347, 59 L. Ed. 1340 (1915).
14 103 U. S.388, 26 L. Ed. 567 .(1881).
15 273 U. S. 536; 71 L. Ed. 759 (1927).
16 238 U. S. 347, 59 L. Ed. 1340 (1915).
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father clause." This provision in the states, either through
constitutional or statutory enactments exempted certain persons from the educational requirements prescribed for voters,
if the person's forefathers were voters on or before a certain
date. The date fixed by these state provisions was previous
to the freeing of the negroes during the Civil War. It was in
effect to allow uneducated whites who could not pass the
educational requirement an exemption while at the same time
keeping the educational qualifications in force to prevent a
great many illiterate negroes from voting. The court held
that such provisions as a condition for voting is a denial of
the right to vote to citizens of the United States "on account
of race, color or previous condition of servitude." The court
thus held these provisions unconstitutional as violative of
the 15th Amendment.
The next important section of the Federal Constitution is
Article 17. This article provides that "The Senate of the
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
state, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each
Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each state shall
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the state legislatures." Under this
amendment the court in United States v. Aczel' 7 held that
the right to vote for United States Senators is not derived
merely from the constitution and laws of the state in which
they are elected, but it has its foundation in the Constitution
of the United States.
The last constitutional provision which is important to
the subject of elections is Amendment 19. This provides that
"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state
on account of sex." This amendment was the result of a bitter struggle on the part of women to gain the right to vote.
Up until the passage and ratification of the amendment,
women were not considered eligible to vote in most of the
17

219 F. 917 (1915).
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states. In 1867 in Kansas a women's suffrage amendment
was offered to the people along with a negro suffrage amendment, but both were defeated. Susan B. Anthony was a leader in the fight to gain the voting franchise for women. Organizations sprang up in different states to secure the privilege for women in the states separately. However, this proved
rather hopeless. These organizations next started a campaign to secure a federal constitutional amendment. Severe
opposition was met in this endeavor also. Then in 1917 the
United States became engaged in World War I. The women of the country performed valuable and noble work. This
broke down the last restraints of male superiority as far as
voting was concerned. Finally in 1919, Congress adopted the
19th amendment and submitted it to the state legislatures.
In 1920 the necessary thirty-six states ratified and the discrimination as to voting on account of sex was prohibited.
Women were thus freed from this discrimination and the way
was open for them by state action to secure the right of suffrage.
Under this important amendment it is interesting to examine its effect by looking at the different judicial holdings
which have been decided under it. First, it can be seen that
the 19th amendment to the Constitution of the United States
automatically struck out the word "male" as a definition of
electors in all state statutes and constitutions regarding elections."8 It is a popular misconception that the 19th Amendment conferred upon women the right to vote. However, this
is not the case, for in the case of State v. Mittle "9the court
held that the 19th amendment merely prohibits discrimination against women on account of their sex in legislation or
constitutional provisions prescribing the qualifications of
suffrage. The right to vote is left to state action and deter18 Graves v. Ewbank, 205 Ala. 174; 87 S. 587 (1921). See also People ex rel
Murray v. Holmes, 341 Ill. 23, 173 N. E. 145 (1930).
19 120 S. C. 526, 113 S. E. 325 (1922); certiorari denied, 260 U. S. 744, 67
L. Ed. 473 (1922). See also In Re Graves, 325 Mo. 888, 30 S. E. (2d) 149 (1930).
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mination, but the qualifications cannot be based on the sex
of the individual.
One of the important questions which has arisen under the
amendment is the liability of women to pay poll tax as required in many states as a prerequisite to voting. For example in Graves v. Eubank 21 the court held that women were
liable for the payment of the poll tax because by erasing the
word "male" from the statute both men and women were
equal as far as the election laws were concerned. The court
said "The result is that upon the final ratification of the 19th
Amendment it had the effect of making our organic as well
as statutory laws applicable to men and women alike, and
placed all women in the state upon the same footing with
men." However, an opposite view was taken in Davis v.
Warde.2 1 There the court held that the 19th Amendment did

not in effect make women liable for poll tax under the statute
of the state requiring "each and every male inhabitant of the
state to pay poll tax." Thus as to the effect of the 19th
Amendment it can be said that it does not confer upon women the right to vote, but simply prohibits discrimination
against them on account of their sex.22
Under these above amendments Congress has enacted
statutes which reaffirm the amendments as far as the federal
government is concerned.23 However, it is interesting to note
that Congress has passed statutes which prohibit Army and
Navy officers from interfering with elections. 24 A criminal
punishment of $5,000 and imprisonment for not more than
five years is provided for any Army or Navy officer who attempts to prescribe or fix "thequalifications of voters at any
election in any state or who attempts to interfere or impose
regulations on any officer conducting an election in any state,
20
21

205 Ala 174, 87 S.587 (1921).
155 Ga. 748, 118 S. E. 378 (1923). Appeal denied 263 U. S. 725, 68 L. Ed.

527 (1923).
22 Glover v.Cobb, (Tex.Civ. App.) 123 S.W. (2d) 794 (1938).
23 See 8 U. S.C.A.Section 31.
24
18 U.S.C.A.Sections 57, 58.
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or who attempts to compel the receiving of any vote of an
unqualified person in an election.
Perhaps the greatest single feature of all these provisions
in the Federal Constitution is that not one of the amendments or articles therein contained confer on anyone the
right to vote. This right springs from the respective states
through their own constitutions and statutes, and the Federal Constitution merely limits and regulates the unlimited
power of the states on the subject of controlling and providing for elections and qualifications of electors. Thus the
states are the source of the privilege of voting.
Blending these constitutional provisions more directly with
this privilege of voting and examining the privilege itself,
it is interesting to see how the courts have held on the nature
and regulation of the elective franchise. In the case of Parvin
v. Wenberg 21 the court of Indiana held that the right of
suffrage is a political right and not a natural one. Thus it is
within the authority of the state to prescribe the manner in
which the franchise shall be exercised. Thus subject to the
above constitutional limitations, the state can define the
qualifications of electors, the form of the ballot, the manner
of choosing candidates, and regulate the conduct of elections
under their police power. Then in the case of Attorncy General ex rel Coneley v. Detroit 26 the court held that the courts
try not to hamper the legislature in the exercise of its control
over the elective franchise, particularly with regard to safeguarding the privilege, but the courts do look at all such
regulatory laws to see that they are reasonable and impartial. All legislative regulations must be aimed at helping and
aiding in the exercise of the elective privilege and not detrimental to its use. The court will declare void any action on
behalf of a legislature which endeavors to hinder or deny the
25
26

130 Ind. 561, 30 N. E. 780 (1892).
78 Mich. 545, 44 N. W. 388 (1889).
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constitutional right of a citizen to vote. This applies also to
acts which indirectly try to impede the exercise of the voter's
rights.
Many of the state constitutions provide that elections
within the state must be "free and equal." To obtain the
significance of these terms and their effect, the court in Ladd
v. Holmes 27 held that "free" means that the elector can exercise his right unrestrained either directly or indirectly by
military or civil authorities. The voter is not to be interfered
with in going to the polls and voting.
Then in Illinois the court in People ex rel Lindstrand v.
Emmerson 28 construing the term "equal" held that it means

that the elector could go to the polls free from coercion and
cast his vote, and that after the vote was cast, it would have
just as much weight in the result as that of any other voter.
The Pennsylvania court in Winston v. Moore 9 held that an
election is "free and equal" when it is open and public to all
qualified electors on the same footing. The elector has the
right to cast his vote and have it honestly counted; that
when there are regulations as to the exercise of the franchise,
the regulations do not deny the right itself nor do they impose so great a burden on the voter that it is an effective
denial of his constitutional right to vote. An example of acts
which are denial of these "free and equal" provisions are
found where class regulations are imposed on voters of certain counties or cities."
Under this section on constitutional provisions it is important to see what power Congress has in the control of
elections. We have seen that under Article 1, Section 4 of the
Federal Constitution, Congress has the power to regulate
congressional elections. 8 1 Thus Congress has power to supplement, amend, or supersede any state regulations which
40 Oregon 167, 66 P. 714 (1901).
28 '333 I1. 606, 165 N. E. 217 (1929).
29
244 Pa. 447, 91 A. 520 (1914).
30 Ibid.
31 Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1884).
27
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have been passed to regulate Congressional elections.3" It
was held earlier in United States v. Wurzback " and Newberry v. United States 3 that this article of the constitution
did not give Congress power to regulate and control party
primaries or conventions which nominated the candidates
for election. However, the rule has been overruled and limited by the case of United States v. Classic.35 In this case the
court held that Congress' power under Article 1, Section 4
of the Constitution, to regulate the elections of its members
includes the power to regulate primary elections and their
conduct, where and when, by the laws of the state, primary
elections are made an integral part of the procedure for the
choice of representatives for Congress and as a practical matter, almost conclusively control the choice for Congressmen.
The power of Congress under this article includes the right
to safeguard the right of the people to choose their representatives in Congress by regulating primary elections in
which the candidates are chosen, particularly where the
primary is in effect the same as the regular election. For example, in the Southern States where the voters are solidly
Democratic, the primary election is the same as a regular
election.
While Article 1, Section 4 gives Congress power to regulate Congressional elections, there is no such comparable
provision in the Constitution with regard to presidential
elections. In the case of McPherson v, Blacker "' the Supreme Court held that the method and manner of appointing
presidential electors belongs exclusively to the states. Congress' only other source of power to regulate elections comes
from the 15th Amendment. However, it is a negative or limitative power since it extends only to discrimination against
an elector "on account of race, color or previous condition of
Smiley
280 U.
34 256 U.
35 313 U.
36 146 U.
32

33

v. Holm, 285 U. S.355, 76 L. Ed. 795 (1932).
S.396, 74 L. Ed. 508 (1930).
S. 232, 65 L. Ed. 913 (1921).
S. 299, 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1941).
S. 1, 36 L. Ed. 869 (1892).
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servitude." It is interesting to note that in the case of Karen
v. United States 37 the court held that when Congress does
legislate within its constitutional powers over elections, the
legislation must be addressed to state action and not toward
individuals since these constitutional limitations apply only
to the Federal Government and the states and not individual
actions. If individuals do act and assume the power of the
states, then Congressional legislation will apply. But if individuals by their own acts discriminate against negroes in
their right to vote, and there is no cloak of state authority,
then the power of Congress is not applicable.
II
ELECTORS.

Under this section the nature of the right to vote in the
individual elector is considered. Much of this material has
been covered under the first section on constitutional provisions. As to electors themselves, the term means all those
citizens who have the constitutional and statutory qualifications which entitle them to vote. Thus the term includes those
who possess these qualifications regardless of whether they
vote or not.3" As to the nature of the right'itself, the case of
Pope v. Williams " held that the right of suffrage is not a
natural, vested right of which a citizen cannot be deprived except by due process of law. Then in Grougerv. Timberlake "
the Indiana court held that the right to vote is a conventional right which is subject to constitutional restrictions even
to the extent of being withheld since it is granted by the constitution or statutes of the states. If the constitutions of the
states did not grant the right, it would not exist to the in37 121 F. 250 (1903).
38 Guinough v. Police Comrs. 30 R. L 212, 74 A. 785 (1909). See also State
ex rel Blair v. Brooks, 17 Wyo. 344, 99 P. 874 (1909).
39 193 U. S. 621, 48 L. Ed. 817 (1904).
40 148 Ind. 38, 46 N. E. 339 (1897); Coffin v. Election Commrs., 97 Mich.
188; 56 N. W. 562 (1893); State ex rel LaFollette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228
N. W. 895 (1930).
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dividual citizen of the states. The right to vote is a political
right which distinguishes it from a civil right or a property
right.4
There are three general views as to the right to vote. One
group of states hold the view that the right of suffrage is an
inherent or natural right which is guaranteed to an individual citizen by a republican form of government. The right is
included and protected by the liberties and immunities of the
form of government. The right to the citizen cannot be deprived except through due process of law.42 This view places
the right to vote on the footing of a natural, inherent right
which every citizen would become entitled to have by living
under a "republican" form of government. This is rather a
liberal view, and gives a broader background as to the source
of the right. For under this view, the state being bound to
guarantee a republican form of government, is bound to
recognize the natural liberties and immunities of the citizen.
Thus a person gains the right upon satisfying the prescribed
qualifications without any enabling or conferring by the
states. If the right to vote is inherently a natural right possessed by the citizen, the state is not the source of the franchise, but rather the state is a mere guardian to preserve the
natural right to the individual. The complete significance of
this view cannot be grasped without remembering the decisions of the courts in construing the effect of the Federal
Constitutional Amendments. This comparison will be postponed for the moment while we examine the other two views
taken on the right to vote with regard to the individual elector.
The second group looks to the elector himself for the basis
of their idea. This group holds that the right to vote is a personal right. In the case of United States v. Bathgate " the
41 Walls v. Brundidge, 109 Ark. 250, 160 S. W. 230 (1913). See also Morris
v. Colorado M. R. Co., 48 Colo. 147, 109 P. 430 (1910).
42 See State ex rel LaFollette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N. W. 895 (1930).
43 246 U. S. 220, 62 L. Ed. 676 (1918). See also Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110
U. S. 651, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1884).
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court said: "The right or privilege to be guarded (the right
to vote) as indicated both by the language employed and
context, was a definite, personal one, capable of enforcement by a court, and not the political, non-judicial one common to all that the public shall be protected against harmful
acts. * * * The right to vote is personal and we have held it
is shielded by the section in question." The section being
considered was the congressional act which undertook to
preserve the freedom and integrity of elections by providing
criminal punishment for interfering with the individual elector exercising his franchise at a congressional election.
This view goes along with the courts' long line of decisions
that the right to vote is a personal one which is conferred by
the states. This view is the support for the idea that the voting franchise is really a privilege and not a strict right. Thus
the state confers the privilege on each citizen under and
pursuant to its own qualification which must be construed in
light of the Federal Constitutional provisions.
The third view taken on this elective franchise is that expressed by the West Virginia court in the case of State v.
Edwards." The court said that "The right to vote is one
reserved by the people of the state to members of a class,
and when so reserved by constitutional enactment, the right
is guaranteed to the class of persons named and is thus given
a dignity not less than any other of many fundamental
rights." This view looks to the people of the states themselves as the source of the right. The people say who is to
vote; they create a class of which persons can become members by satisfying the prescribed qualifications. Once a person has attained the class he is possessed of a right which is
guaranteed to him by the constitution, the organ of the people creating the right. Thus once the right is gained and possessed, it is a right which is fundamental And is on an equal
plane with the persons' other fundamental rights of life, liberty and property. Just because a person attains the right
44

95 W. Va. 599, 122 S. E. 272 (1924).
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there is no guarantee that he will retain it. He is protected
from loss of the franchise while he satisfies the necessary
qualifications, but once he loses the prescribed prerequisites
which make him a member of this electors' class, he loses his
class membership. Thus he loses his right. But as long as
he maintains his class membership, he possesses his fundamental, constitutionally granted right to vote.
Under the first view presented which dealt with the right
to vote as an inherent natural right in the individual citizen,
there are several important concepts which must be considered in light of the court's decisions under the Constitution
of the United States. Under the view taken above the right
to vote is guaranteed by the republican form of government,
and is a natural right. It would seem that the voting franchise has its source in a "republican form" of government.
Now under the Constitution, "the United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government." " Now if the right to vote is a natural inherent
right which is guaranteed by such a form of government, then
under this Article of the Constitution, the United States
through Congress should be able to regulate and control the
states with regard to voting, in seeing that a republican form
is guaranteed to the state. In other words by taking this liberal view, it would seem that the United States, through Congress, has a greater part in the franchise than the Supreme
Court has held that it has.
For in the case of United States v. Cruikshank " the court
held that the right to vote is not conferred by the Federal
Constitution. There are two systems of government in this
country - one of the states and the other of the United
States. Each is distinct from the other, has citizens of its
own, whose rights it alone must protect. The same person
may be a citizen of the United States and the state at the
same time, but his rights of citizenship under one of these
45
46

U. S. Constitution, Article 4, Section 4.
92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875).

THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE IN THE U. S.

governments are different from those under the other. The
government of the United States cannot grant or secure to
its citizens rights or privileges which are not expressly or by
implication placed in its jurisdiction. Thus the court has decided that the right to vote does come from the Federal Constitution. Then in Minnesota v. Happersett4 7 the court held
that the constitution did not confer the right of suffrage on
anyone and that the United States has no voters of its own
creation in the states. And in United States v. Reese 48 the
court held that the right to vote in the states comes from the
states. Then in Pape v. Williams4 the court said "The
privilege to vote in a state is within the jurisdiction of the
state itself, to be exercised as the state may direct and upon
such terms as to it may seem proper."
The court further held that the right of suffrage is not
ordinarily considered as being within the privilege and immunities of a citizen of the United States.
Now with this in mind and with the view that the right
to vote is inherent in the citizen guaranteed by a republican
form of government, it can be asked whether the Federal
Government under Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution,
guaranteeing to every state a republican form of government, could force a state to confer the right of voting on its
citizens if the state should abolish the right? Could the
United States reason that since the right to vote is a natural
inherent right guaranteed by a republican form of government, and the right guaranteed was abolished or unprovided
for by the state, then the state government was not one of
a republican form? Thus since the United States must guarantee such form of government to the states, it had authority
under Article 4, Sec. 4 to force the state to provide for election privileges. It seems that the analogy has gone far enough
to see that such could not be the case in view of the above
47
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21 Wall. 178, 22 E. Ed. 627 (1875).
92 U. S. 214, 23 L. Ed. 563 (1876).
103 U. S. 621,48 L. Ed. 817 (1903).
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Supreme Court decisions. However, if the liberal view of the
right to vote as an inherent natural right were carried out to
its conclusion, such a situation of reasoning might arise. To
answer the above questions which have been posed, it is sufficient to say that in view of the decisions, the United States
would have neither the authority nor the inclination to force
a state to establish the right to vote.
It is interesting to note that the right of suffrage in the
individual elector which is conferred by constitutional and
statutory means cannot be denied to that elector unless he
is given notice and an opportunity to be heard. This was so
held in Pierce v. Superior Court.5 °
An interesting question arises as to electors within territories of the United States. However, since the subject of
territories is under the jurisdiction of Congress, and Congress can provide for the affairs of the territory, Congress
can authorize and permit the inhabitants of the territory to
vote for its own elections. Congress would be limited in the
power by the constitutional limitations as far as discrimination goes, but on the whole Congress would be free to determine whether properly qualified persons within a territory
will be allowed the privilege of suffrage. Thus it would appear that where Congress had conferred the right of suffrage
on territorial residents, Congress by the same manner can
take away, modify or alter the right to vote as it sees fit.5 1
For being the creator of the power, Congress can also destroy
it.
As far as the individual elector is concerned we have seen
the effect of different constitutional provisions on his right
to vote in the preceding section. For example, in Guinn v.
United States 52 the court in construing the effect of the 15th
Amendment held that the amendment did not take away the
power from the states over elections which they possessed
50 1 Cal. 759, 37 P. (2d) 453 (1934).
51 Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15, 29 L. Ed. 47 (1884).
52 238 U. S. 347, 59 L. Ed-1340 (1915).
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from the beginning. The amendment operates only to take
away the authority from the states and the Federal government from discriminating against any citizen of the United
States with regard to voting because of his color, race or
previous condition of servitude.
Thus we have seen in a general way the source of the
right to vote and we have seen who the electors are in relation to that right. While this section has been concerned
mainly with the source of the right, it must be remembered
that the source of the elective franchise determines who the
electors will be. In the next section, Qualifications of Electors, we shall be interested in the specific individual elector
to see how he may qualify to gain this privilege of suffrage.
III
THE QUALIFICATIONS OF ELECTORS

Since the source of the right to vote rests in the states, it
is important to see how they have acted in order to determine who shall vote. The states have attained this end by
prescribing certain qualifications which a citizen must have
in order to obtain the privilege of voting. Generally this has
been accomplished by constitutional provisions. In some
states the general outline of required qualifications are provided for, and the specific prerequisites are left to the legislatures to work out.
Generally, however, the states' power to define the qualifications of its voters is practically unlimited, except that the
states must not violate the Federal Constitutional provisions.
This view has been taken in Guinn v. United States " and
Pope v. Williams." In the opinion of the justices in Re Opinion of Justices " it was held that the state power in this
53 -238 U. S. 347, 59 L. Ed. 1340 (1915).
193 U. S. 621, 48 L. Ed. 817 (1904); see also Election Commrs. v. Knight,
187 Ind. 108, 117 N. E. 565 (1917); Kenneam v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497, 11 N. E.
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916 (1887).
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118 Me. 544, 107 A. 673 (1919).
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field, subject to the above limitations, was unlimited as far
as elections for local officers and presidential electors. With
these general statements in mind let us turn to the actual
qualifications as prescribed by the states.
In the case of Morris v. Powell 56 it was held that where
the state constitution enumerates the qualifications and
classes of citizens who may exercise the privilege of voting,
these constitutionally established prerequisites are to be
considered the final and only tests with regard to the franchise. The legislatures are not authorized to change, add to
or suspend any of these qualifications later by legislation,
unless the constitution expressly empowers it to do so, or the
authority can be necessarily implied from the constitution
itself. Thus where the state constitution is specific in its
enumeration of the qualifications required of a citizen to
vote, these are the prerequisites which are needed and no
more regardless of what the legislature may do or say. In
the case of State ex rel Taylor v. French " the court of Ohio
construing legislative action on the subject of qualifications
under a specific constitutional provision, held that the only
method by which the qualifications of an elector could be
changed was through a constitutional amendment. Under
the same circumstances, the court of Indiana held in Morris
v. Powell " that a person could not be compelled to give
proof of certain qualifications which were not required of him
under the state constitution in order that he could vote in an
election. These cases form the general rule on the subject of
constitutionally prescribed qualifications.
Some state constitutions contain certain of the qualifications required of a citizen to vote, but instead of setting them
56 125 Ind. 281, 25 N. E. 221 (1890). See also Reson v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161, 87
Am. Dec. 52 (1865); State ex rel LaFollette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N. W.
895 (1930).
57 96 Ohio St. 172, 117 N. E. 173 (1917).
58 125 Ind. 281, 25 N. E. 221 (1890); see also Coffin v. Election Commrs.,
97 Mich. 188, 56 N. W. 567 (1893), where the legislature was denied the right to
change the qualifications of a voter prescribed by -the constitution under the power
to "prescribe" by law the time and place of holding the election.
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out in detail, the constitution expressly or impliedly authorizes the legislature to fill in or add to the requirements. Under these circumstances many questions arise as to the extent
or reasonableness of the legislative requirement. Where
there is expressed authority for the legislature to fill in the
framework of the constitution as to the prerequisites the
courts are concerned only with the general principle of
whether the acts passed unnecessarily hinder or impede the
right of suffrage to the citizen.
The courts have their most difficult times on this subject
where the constitution does -not expressly authorize the
legislature to act. When acts are passed to give added clarity
or definition to the prescribed qualifications, the court has
to examine carefully each proposal with the view of finding
the implied authorization for the legislative action. In a
great many cases the grounds for sustaining the legislative
action is hinged on the constitutional provision which provides that the legislature may "prescribe by law the time
and manner of holding the election." However, it must be
said that unless the action so prescribed by the legislature is
clearly helpful to the voting right, the courts will conservatively hold against the proposed act.
Next, it should be noted just what particular qualifications
are needed by a citizen in order that he might become eligible
to exercise the right of suffrage. While each state differs as
to the different prerequisites, certain general requirements
are contained in most all of the states. The following are
briefly the most common qualifications called for by state
constitutions:
1. Citizenship. All the states require that those who
exercise the voting franchise must be citizens of the state.
In the case of People ex rel Hedgman v. Board of Registration " the court of Michigan held that since the constitu59 26 Mich. 51, 12 Am. Rep. 297 (1872). An interesting question arises as to
marriages between American-born women and alien men. Whether the woman loses
her right to vote or not, see MacKenzie v. Hare, 165 Cal. 776, 134 P. 713, annotation, Ann. Cases 1915 B, 265.
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tion required that a person voting must be a citizen, a nonnaturalized alien was denied the right to vote. This is the
first and most generally uniform requirement prescribed by
state constitutions or statutes.
2. Age. Generally most of the states provide that citizens must be twenty-one years of age before they are able to
exercise the right to vote. This is an arbitrary age line drawn
by constitutions.6" However, during this present war, World
War II, there has been great agitation to lower the age requirement. The argument is proposed that since young men
and women of the ages from eighteen to twenty-one are
fighting for the country and particularly since young men of
that age are subject to be drafted these young people should
have the right to vote and express their views by ballot. If
these people are old enough to fight and die for their country, then they are old enough to vote for the government of
the country. This argument gains weight when it is realized
that the age requirement as set by the states is a purely arbitrary one. There are active movements under way in many
states at the present time to allow these young people to
vote. This is particularly true since the passage of the Federal Ballot Act.
3. Sex. As we have seen under the discussion in a prior
section on the 19th Amendment, the United States Constitution before 1920 did not guarantee to women the right to
vote. For in the case of Minor v. Happersett61 the court held
that a woman's status as a citizen, under the Federal Constitution did not confer upon her the right to vote. The court
held that this right was constitutionally limited to males.
There were some states which allowed women to exercise the
right of suffrage in special elections and even general elections.62 In 1920 with the ratification of the 19th Amendment,
60 Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 Ill. 250, 52 N. E. 303 (1898).
61 21 Wall. (U. S.) 162, 22 L. Ed. 627 (1875).
62 Scown v. Czarnecke, 264 II. 305, 106 N. E. 276 (1914); also Gouger v.
Timberlake, 148 Ind. 38, 46 N. E. 339 (1897); also Coggeshall v. Des Moines, 138
Iowa 730, 117 N. W. 309 (1908).
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the question as to women's suffrage was settled. No longer
could there be any discrimination in the right to vote on account of sex. Then in the case of People ex rel Murry v.
Holmes the Illinois court held that the amendment did not
confer the right to vote on women, but it merely prevented
discrimination against them because of their sex. Women
were thus free to exercise the right to vote on an equal with
males.
4. Race or Color. While earlier state provisions before
the Civil War prevented the negro from voting, the passage
of the 15th Amendment struck down the states' discriminations. After the ratification of the amendment, the right to
vote could not be denied to a citizen an account of race, color
or previous condition of servitude.
5. Residence. The states usually require that each elector must reside within the state, county, and voting district
for a prescribed period of time before the election in order
to qualify as an elector. The aim of this requirement is to
guard against fraud and the difficulty of identifying persons
seeking to vote. Also it affords some certainty that the voter
has become.a member of the community and has a definite
interest in the governmental affairs of the place.6 4
As to the term "residence" the court of Indiana in the
case of Quinn v. State 6" held that the term as used in
the State Constitution for voting purposes cannot be made a
matter of legislative construction but is purely a judicial
question. It is also well settled that a person must have a
domicil or a residence somewhere.
Under the provision of residence, an interesting problem
arises in the case of students and teachers seeking residence
for voting purposes in the place where their schools are located. The residence of these classes of people depend upon
the constitutional provisions and the construction placed up63 341 Ill. 23, 173 N. E. 145 (1930).
64 'See Howard v. Skinner, 87 Ind. 556, 40 A. 379 (1898).
65 35 Ind. 485, 9 Am. Rep. 754 (1871).
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on them, as to the method of acquiring residence. But the
mere fact that the student or the teacher is enrolled or attending the school does not satisfy the residence requirement.
It was said in the case of Wickham v. Coyner 66 that the
"fact that one is a student in a university does not entitle
him to vote where the university is located nor does it of itself prevent his voting there. He may vote at the seat of the
university if he has his residence there and is otherwise qualified." Then in Re Foster 11 the court held that if a student
does acquire a domicil at the school town, it is not retroactive so as to date back to his entrance into the school.
In the famous case of Anderson v. Pifer 68 the court of
Illinois held that if the student enters college with the intention of returning to his former home after his graduation, he
does not attain a voting residence at college. Then in the
case of People v. Osborne 69 the court held that where a student is self supporting and he gives up his former residence
and comes to college with the intention of remaining in the
county after his studies are over, he acquires a residence for
the purpose of voting.
In the case of Dale v. Irwin7 it was held that undergraduates at a college, who were free from parental control
and had no other place to go to in the event of sickness, were
considered to be residents within the meaning of the statute
requiring a permanent abode as a residential requirement,
the term "permanent abode" being considered to mean an
abode which the occupant had no present intention of leaving and they were thus entitled to vote from the school.
Finally, in the case of Gross v. Wahl TI the court held that a
student at a university who is self-supporting, who had voted
from places other than his original home, and who might not
66 30 Ohio C. C. 765 (1902).
67
68

69
Mich.
7o
71

123 Misc. 852, 206 N. Y. S. 853 (1923).

315 Ill. 164, 146 N..E. 171 (1924).
170 Mich. 143, 135 N. W. 921 (1912). See also Saunders v. Hanna, 98
515, 57 N. W. 738 (1894).
78 Ill. 170, 37 A. L. R. 142 (1875).
164 Wis. 91, 159 N. W. 549, 37 A. L. R. 144 (1916).
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stay at the university town, depending upon the opportunity
presenting itself at the end of his course, was entitled to vote.
The court felt that such a student showed an abandonment
of his former home and a sufficient intention to remain in the
university town to gain a residence there.
The above rules apply generally to the cases of teachers.
A teacher does not become a resident for the purpose of voting in the school town unless he has given up his former
residence and has no intention of returning to that former
residence.7"
An interesting question arises under the present war situation on the subject of residence. Many people are moved
around by the Federal government to work on defense projects. These people live in government housing projects on
land acquired by the Federal authorities. The question presented is, do these people gain residence in the place where
they are located on Federal government property? In the
case of State of Kansas ex rel Parker v. Corcoran11 this
question was answered. In the Act of Congress providing for
the housing of national defense workers," there was a provision for the acquisition of real property for the purpose
and the act further provided that such acquisition shall not
deprive any state or political subdivision thereof of its civil
and criminal jurisdiction in and over such property, or impair the civil rights under the state or local law of the inhabitants on such property. The court held that "civil
rights" as used in this section was broad enough to include
"political rights." The court found that the Federal Government did not acquire exclusive jurisdiction over the land in
Kansas City to be used for housing purposes, nor did it gain
exclusive jurisdiction over land leased for temporary living
in the area. Thus without this exclusive control, the persons
71 See Nelson v. Bullard, 155 Minn. 479, 194 N. W. 308 (1923); Crawford
v. Wilson, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 504 (1848); Perry v. Reynolds, 53 Conn. 527, 3 A.
555 (1885).
73 155 Kan. 714, 128 P. (2d) 999 (1942).
74 42 U. S. C. A. Sec. 1501 et seq.
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living upon this land were not excluded from the right to
vote because of living on the land obtained by the Federal
Government. The court held that the Federal Government
is not required to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all the
land it purchases within a state. It can work out any agreement it desires with the state as to the purchase and matters
of jurisdiction. The mere fact that a person works for the
Federal Government does not determine a person's qualification to vote. Thus the court held that the persons were entitled to register to vote in the state election provided they
possessed the other necessary qualifications."
6. Ownership of Property. Generally the ownership of
real estate and other forms of property have been abandoned by the state as a qualification to vote in state and national elections. However, in special or limited elections such
as school district or drainage district elections, the qualification is still required. For these latter cases, the term "owner"
was construed in People ex rel Shakles v. Milan 76 where the
statute provided that at all elections every owner of land
within the district shall be enrolled to vote. The term meant
that the person must have the legal title to the land, and a
person who held a contract to purchase is not within the
meaning of the statute.
7. Payment of Taxes. If the state constitution or the
legislature has not been so restricted in its authority in this
regard, either may provide as a qualification for voting that
the citizen must present proof of the payment of taxes."
Most generally this tax requirement takes the form of poll
taxes. In the case of Breedlove v. Suttles 11 the court held
that statutes and constitutional provisions which require the
payment of poll tax as a requirement to the right to vote or
75 For a similar case holding the same way, see Johnson v. Morrill, ...... Cal.
.......
126 P. (2d) 873 (1942).
76 89 Colo. 556, 5 P. (2d) 249, 95 A. L. R. 1099 (1931).
77 See United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. Ed. 563 (1876).
78 183 Ga. 189, 188 S. E. 140 (1936); affirmed in 302 U. S. 277, 82 L. Ed.
252 (1938).
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to register was not a violation of the privilege and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution (Article 4, Section 2).
Then in the case of Davis v. Teague 11 the statute of Alabama exempted persons who had served in the military or
naval forces of the United States between January 1, 1917
to November 11, 1918 from paying poll tax. The court held
that this statute did not deny "equal protection of the laws"
since the right of voting is considered a political privilege
which the state can control or regulate. The court held that
the right of suffrage and of holding office is not a privilege or
immunity, belonging to a citizen of the United States, nor is
it an inherent or natural right but it constitutes a political
privilege which the state may regulate so long as the right
to vote is not denied or abridged to any person on account
of race, color or previous condition of servitude.
8. Mentality. Many of the states have constitutional
or legislative provisions which prevent lunatics or idiots from
voting. This disqualification is based on the principle that
these classes of persons do not possess the sufficient reason
or understanding to know what the purpose of the election
is or what issue is being decided in the election. The right to
vote carries with it the responsibility of understanding the
purpose of the right.
9. Literacy. The presence of this requirement in the
various states depends upon whether the constitution or the
legislature is empowered to make it a qualification. In Davis
v. Allen 80 the court held that illiteracy will not disqualify
a person from voting providing there is no constitutional or
statutory provision to the contrary. Then in Williams v. Mississippi," a case concerning the famous "grandfather
clauses," the court held that an election cannot be subjected
to a literacy or educational test where it is not provided for
79 220 Ala. 309, 125 S. 51 (1929); appeal dismised in 281 U. S. 695, 74 L.
Ed. 1123 (1930).
80 157 W. Va. 84, 160 S. E. 85 (1931).
81 '170 U. S. 213, 42 L. Ed. 1012 (1898).
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by the constitution or statute. However, where such provisions are established in the constitution or statutes, they
are valid and do not violate the Federal Constitution as long
as they do not directly or indirectly discriminate among
electors.
There have been attempts under the guise of literacy tests
which on the surface establish regular standards of literacy
to be passed by all persons as a qualification for voting.
However, certain exemptions exist where a person's ancestors before a specified period were voters and these ancestors voted during that period as set up by the statute, the
person seeking to vote under this literacy requirement was
exempted from the test. In other words the date set by the
statute based on a period of previous elections and the person's ancestors was made controlling as to the applicability
-of the test. This date was usually set before the negro was
set free or before any negro could vote. The effect of this
type of statute was to allow illiterate whites whose ancestors
voted on or before the date set in the statute to be exempt
from the literacy test while all the negroes who wanted to
vote could not gain the exemption since the date in the acts
was set at a time before negroes could vote. These acts were
held unconstitutional 8 on the grounds of discriminating
against citizens on account of race, color and previous condition of servitude. Since most negroes were illiterate, they
could neither pass the test nor gain the exemption. This was
a method attempting to circumvent the effect of the 15th
Amendment and was declared void on the grounds of discrimination.
Closely related to the subject of qualifications is the subject of disqualification or disfranchisement. In the case of
Blair v. Redgely 8 the court held that a state has the right
to provide that any person who is convicted of a crime shall
82 Meyers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368, 59 L. Ed. 1349 (1915). Also Guinn v.
United States, 238 U. S. 347, 59 L. Ed. 1340 (1915).
83 41 Mo. 63, 97 Am. Dec. 248 (1868).
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lose his right to vote. The court based its decision on the
right of the state to preserve the purity and integrity of
elections. Many of the states have enacted such disfranchising laws. Some states have gone as far as to disfranchise a
person who was convicted of bribery in an election. These
latter provisions were upheld in the cases of Baum v. State 84
in Indiana and Jones v. Board of Registrars "' in Mississippi.
It is difficult to generalize state constitutional provisions for
disfranchisement because of conviction of a felony. However, every state has some provision on the subject, but
they differ as to the extent or the severity of the crime which
will disfranchise the convict.8"
Another interesting problem is raised under these state
provisions where a person is convicted of a crime in a federal
court. In the case of State of Missouri ex rel Barrett v. Sarterebus 87 the court held that where the state constitution
provides that "persons convicted of a felony, or crime connected with the exercise of the right of suffrage may be excluded by law from the right of voting," it was within the
authority of the state legislature under the act to deny the
right to vote to any person who was convicted of a felony
under the laws of the United States. This is generally the
prevailing rule on the subject. Thus a conviction of a felony
or an infamous crime in a federal court will result in the
disfranchisement of the person convicted under most states'
provisions.
Under the same subject, there is a split of authority as to
whether a pardon granted to a person convicted of a crime
restores the person to his right to vote in the state.88 In the
84
85
86

157 Ind. 282, 61 N. E. 672 (1901).
56 Miss. 766, 31 Am. Rep. 385 (1879).
See State ex rel Olsen v. Langer, 65 N. D. 68, 256 N. W. 377 (1934); see

also Cowan v. Prowse, 93 Ky. 166, 19 S. W. 407 (1892); and U. S. v. Barnabo,
Fed. Cases No. 14,522,. ..... Mo ....... 175 S. W. (2d) 787, 149 A. L. R. 1075 (1943).

87 ...... MO ....... 175 S. W. (2d) 787, 149 A. L. R. 1075 (1943).
88 Holding pardon restores person to his right to vote: Reson v. Farr, 24
Ark. 161, 87 Am. Dec. 52 (1865), Jones v. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766, 31

Am. Rep. 385 (1879),

where a pardon by the President of the United States of
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case of Osborne v. County Court 89 the court held that where
a person has served his punishment for the crime, he is no
longer disfranchised under some constitutional provisions.
Now that we have seen the general qualifications which
are provided for electors in order to gain the right to vote,
it is important to examine the manner in which the state sees
to it that all these persons who vote possess these prerequisites. The states in all instances attain the result through the
process of registration. Under this system at a specified
period before the election is to be held, each person desiring
to vote must appear and give proof of his qualifications. If
his qualifications are all in order, his name is entered on the
Voters' Registration Books in his voting district. This qualification is recorded and he is then eligible to vote.
There are different procedures as to registration. In some
states the elector may have to go before a registration board
of his voting district. In other states, the political parties
make a canvass of all the eligible voters and register them at
the time of the canvass. But whatever method is used, this
process of registration is the way the states check on the
qualifications of the voters. This procedure of registration
must be complied with on behalf of all the electors or else
they will not be allowed to vote. Thus the process becomes
a qualification to vote, namely, if the person complies with
the process of registration he can vote, but if he does not
comply he is prevented from voting even if he is otherwise
fully qualified. Usually this latter situation is not as extreme
as it appears, since the states usually provide for exceptions
to the rule in cases of hardship and upon proof of qualifications through other means. But this depends entirely on the
provisions in the different states.
one convicted of -the embezzlement in a Federal Court restores the offender to his
right as a voter in the state. Arnett v. Stumbo, ...... Ky ........ 153 S. E. (2d) 889
(1941) where the pardon power in the governor to restore rights of suffrage was
expressly granted by the constitution. Contra: Ex Parte Hunter, 2 W. Va. 122.
89

68 W. Va. 189, 69 S. E. 470 (1910).
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Let us examine some of the courts' decisions on the general nature of these registration laws. For example in the
case of People ex rel Grinnell v. Hoffman 00 the court of
Illinois held that a registration law which requires the giving of information as to the age, sex, residence and other
qualifications of an applicant for registration or voting, is
clearly within the power of the legislature to provide. Then
in the case of Morris v. Powell " the court of Indiana held
that the registration laws should be impartial, uniform, and
reasonable, giving to all citizens who have the right to vote
a fair and reasonable opportunity to exercise their right to
vote.
There have been questions raised as to the validity of
these registration laws. However, it can be generally stated
that the courts have recognized and upheld the legislature's
power where it has been expressly granted to the legislature
by the constitutions and also where there has not been express grants of authority. 2
This brings up the main point about the general constitutionality of these registration laws. As we have seen most
states provide in their constitutions for the qualifications
which are necessary in order to exercise the voting privilege.
Such requirements as to age, citizenship, and residence are
the most common. A person who thus possesses these qualities is eligible to vote. Where the state constitution makes
these qualifications specific and extensive, the requirements
are exclusive, and the legislature does not have the authority
over the power to add to or alter these set qualifications.
Now the problem arises with regard to registration laws
when the legislatures pass such acts in order to establish and
confirm the constitutionally required qualifications in the in90 116 11. 587, 56 Am. Rep. 793, 14 A.L. R. 260 (1886).
91 125 Ind. 281, 25 (1890).
02 See Blue v. State, 206 Ind. 98, 188 N. E. 583 (1934); McMahon v. Swannab, 66 Ga. 217, 42 Am, Rep. 65 (1880) ; People v. Gordon, 274 Inl. 462, 113 N. E.
864 (1916); Atty. Gen. ex rel Conely v. Detroit, 78 Mich. 545, 44 N. W. 388
(1889); see also 18 Am. Jur. 231, n. 1.
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dividual electors. If the person, possessing all the qualifications, does not conform to the registration laws, he cannot
vote. Thus in effect the legislature by passing the registration act has added a new requirement to the already established constitutional ones. Where the view is taken that the
qualifications as set out in the constitution are exclusive and
the legislature does not have the authority to add to or take
away from these set requirements, these registration acts are
attacked on the ground that the legislatures have in fact
added another qualification. Before we consider this particular situation a word should be added concerning those
states which provide expressly for registration laws.
Some of the constitutions provide that a system of registration be established. Where this is the case, there is no
question as to the legality of this type of law when passed
by the legislature. There is no question as to the legislature
adding other qualifications than those contained in the constitution. The only questions which are considered by the
courts concerning these laws are whether they are reasonable
and uniform.
Now let us consider again the cases where the constitution
has provided for the general qualifications for voting but
where there is no provision as to the establishment of a system of registration. When the legislature enacts such laws,
they are attacked on the ground that it is a legislative attempt to add qualifications for the privilege of voting. However, it must be said that generally where the aim of such
registration laws is not to add to the constitutional qualifications but is merely to define and certify as to their existence in each voter, the laws are upheld. The courts view
these laws in the light that as long as the laws are reasonable and uniform to the above aims, it is an aid and a preservation of the elective franchise.9" Thus generally in the ab93 See United States v. Quinn, 8 Blatchf. 48, Fed. Cases No. 16,110 (1870);
Simmons v. Byrd, 142. Ind. 274, 136 N. E. 14 (1022); see annotation (I A. L. R.
350, 351, 353.
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sence of an express constitutional provision for registration
laws, the courts have upheld them.9 4 The presence of necessity and need is an important factor in these decisions. There
are cases, however, where for reasons of sickness and reasons
beyond the control of the person preventing them from registering the registration laws have been held to be unreasonable.95 With these generalizations in mind, let us examine
some of the courts' decisions rendered on the subject.
In Blue v. State ex rel Brown9 the court of Indiana held
that the registration law did not add to the constitutional
qualifications but merely were aimed to regulate the right
to vote -by furnishing proof of the existence of the qualifications. The constitution by establishing the qualifications to
vote, implies legislative enactment of such registration 'laws
so as to determine the established requirements. And also, if
the voter is allowed to have a reasonable time within which
to register, the fact that he fails to comply with the law
through some means, does not invalidate the law. This brings
up one of the grounds of attack on these acts, namely, that
the voter is not given enough time within which to register.
However, if the laws are reasonable as to the time element,
they are sustained.9 7 For example in Michigan in the case
of Attorney General ex rel Conely v. Detroit 98 the court held
that where the statute provided that a person must reside
sixteen days in his precinct before the election to be eligible,
but where the constitution of Michigan set the time of resi94 For cases generally upholding registration acts as constitutional see Mason
v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328, 45 L. Ed. 214 (1900); Simmons v. Byrd, 192 Ind. 274,
136 N. E. 14 (1922); annotation 91 A. L. R. 350, 351.
For cases holding registration acts unconstitutional on various grounds see: Re
appointment of Supervisors, 52 F. 254 (1892); Rouse v. Thompson, 228 Ill. 522,
81 N. E. 1109 (1907); annotation 91 A. L. R. 351.
95 White v. Nultnomab County, 13 Ore. 317, 10 P. 484 (1886); Dells v. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 555, 6 N. W. 216 (1880).
96 206 Ind. 98, 188 N. E. 583 (1934).
97 State ex rel Canoll v. Superior Court, 113 Wash. 54, 193 P. 226 (1920);
and Simmons v. Byrd, 192 Ind. 274, 136 N. E. 14 (1922) where 29 days before
election was held reasonable.

98

78 Mich. 545, 44 N. W. 388 (1889).
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dence in the precinct at ten days, the statute was void as
denying the elector his constitutional right to vote.
Considering again the decisions rendered generally under
the registration acts, the case of Pope v. Williams " is outstanding. There the court held that where a person was required to register his intention to become a resident of the
state before he could register to vote, such a law was reasonable, and it was not an act to hinder or delay the exercise of the voting franchise, nor did it add another qualification for the right to vote to those set out in the constitution.
It was not considered an increase in the length of time required for residence as a qualification for voting either. Then
in the case of Morris v. Powell 10 the court held that the act
of the legislature which makes the exercise of the right of
suffrage, by one who has been absent from the state for six
months or more on business of the state, dependent on proof
that he is a taxpayer of the county, and that his name has
been continuously kept on the tax duplicate during his absence, is unconstitutional and void, as it requires a property
qualification in the class of voters in addition to the qualifications set out in the constitution.
Next in the case of State of Ohio ex rel Klein v. Hillenbrand 101 the statute provided that the person seeking to
place his name on the registration list as a qualified elector of
a municipality, must state his age. The statute was attacked
as being unreasonable and in violation of the Ohio constitution. The court held that the statutory requirement did not
deny the constitutional right of a citizen to vote, nor does
it unreasonably impair the exercise of the right. The court
held that such requirement of registration was a reasonable
uniform and impartial provision to regulate, facilitate, and
secure the exercise of the voting privilege. It is aimed at preventing frauds at elections. In North Dakota, in the case of
99 98 Md. 56, 56 A. 543 (1903) affirmed in 193 U. S. 621, 48 L. Ed. 817,
91 A. L. R. 355 (1904).
100
125 Ind. 281, 25 N. E. 221 (1890).
101 ......
Ohio St .......
130 N. E. 29 (1920).
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Fitzmaurice v. Willis 102 the court in construing an act of the
legislature which required that at an election no persons
could vote unless their names were on the registration lists,
or they could file affidavits that they were residents of the
precinct, and giving their residence, held that the statute
was a reasonable regulation for the conduct of the election
to prevent fraud. The court then said, "It (the statute) deprives no one of his right to vote, and is only a reasonable
regulation under which he may exercise such right." But in
Mills v. Green "I the court held a registration act invalid
which required that a person seeking to register must file an
affidavit stating his name, age, occupation and residence at
the time of the general registration in 1882 or at the time
he became entitled to register, with a list of all the places
he had resided since he was eligible to register and his affidavit must be supported by two persons who were 21 years
of age on June 30, 1882 or the time he became eligible to
register. The provision was aimed at keeping negroes from
voting and was void for that reason.
In the case of Davis v. Allen 104 the registrar of elections
asked the applicant such questions as to the payment of poll
tax, which was not required as a qualification and asked as
to what requisites were necessary to enable one to register.
The court held that these questions were improper in that
they were designed to test the knowledge of the person as
to the law of registration, and were used in an educational
test which was beyond the required ability necessary on the
part of a person to fill out an application. The registrar is
entitled to ask questions concerning the person's qualifications as a voter, but the knowledge of the registration laws
is not a prerequisite to the person's right to register. Finally,
in the case of State ex rel Weinberger v. Miller '0' the court
20 N. D. 372, 127 N. W. 95 (1910).
67 F. 878, reversed on other grounds in 68 F. 852, and appeal dismissed in
159 U. S. 651, 40 L. Ed. 293 (1895).
104 ...... Va ....... 160 S. E. 85, 76 A. L. R. 1234 (1931).
105 87 Ohio St. 12, 99 N. E. 1078 (1912); see also People ex rel Chadboumr
v. Voorhis, 236 N. Y. 437, 141 N. E. 907 (1923).
102
1o
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held that the provision of the legislature that the ballots be
printed was not an addition of an educational qualification
to the existing requirements of the constitution.
Finally, on this subject of registration, it is interesting
to
note that an important problem is brought forth when a
name is illegally or improperly placed on the registration
list. The remedy and the procedure of purging these lists is
extremely important, particularly in large areas where "boss
control" holds sway. Each state has its own laws of purging
and no general statements can be made on the subject. However, the two remedies which have been attempted in order
to force a purging of the lists by the registration boards are
injunction and mandamus. Whether such relief is granted
or denied depends upon both the jurisdiction and facts of
the case. °6
Thus we have seen the development of the elector's right
to vote through the stages of qualifications of the voter so
that he can exercise the privilege. We have examined the
elector's position with reference to his own personal qualities
in the field of voting. Next we must turn to external fields to
see how and through what mediums this franchise is exercised. Perhaps the most important influence on the individual
elector and the greatest organizer of all the electors for concerted action is the political party. This is the next subject
which we must examine. In this field we will also see how the
elector participates in the nominating process through primary elections.
IV
POLITICAL PARTIES AND PRIMARY ELECTIONS.

A good definition of a political party is found in the case
of Kelso v. Cook. 10 7 The court pointed out that a political

party is an unincorporated voluntary association of persons
106

Pierce v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. (2d) 759, 37 P. (2d) 460 (1934). Also

see 96 A. L. R. 1049, 1050.
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184 Ind. 173, 110 N. E. 987 (1916).
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who are bound together by certain ideas of governmental
affairs and who maintain certain views as to political beliefs
as to how the government is to operate. These groups seek
to carry out their ideas by urging them on all the other electors. They seek to carry out their beliefs by electing officers
to the government who share in their ideas. This right to
associate together for the sponsoring of certain political beliefs is a right which cannot be unreasonably interfered with
by the legislature.' 08
Ordinarily men do not act independently in government
or in their choice of officers, and during the nineteenth century it was a source of great marvel in the United States
that such vast power and influence was held by these political parties. This situation was due to the reliance for organization and education of the people as electors which the
political parties handled almost exclusively during that century. Candidates were nominated and elections were practically run by the parties. In the midst of this process, the
functions of the government were carried on through political
organization, and the states made no move to control or regulate the activities of the parties.
The states awoke to this great concentration of power
in political parties when the growth of the "boss" came
forth in the latter part of the 19th and the early part of
the 20th century. For the first time the great fields of patronage, party favors, government contracts and economic
control were seen. Corrupt practices such as buying and selling votes, ballot stuffing, crooked election officials and the
like came forth with open notoriety. In the '80's with California leading, the states began to regulate party activities
in the nominating processes. The legislatures began, at public demand, to regulate more closely political activity of
these associations. In 1912 primary conventions 'for the
nomination of the candidates for the presidency were estab108

.Sarlis v. State, 201 Ind. 88, 166 N. E. 270, 67 A. L. R. 718 (1929).
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lished. Now almost all of the states have some regulation regarding the nomination of candidates by the parties. Most
of the crude, open forms of corruption have died out, but
more subtle and clever means have developed. The "machine politicians" still control the political parties, and
"bosses" still hold sway over the organizations. The laws of
control have merely tended to drive a large part of the
"political bossing" into the background as pre-nominating
or pre-election activity.
There are definite reasons why this kind of groups have
grown so fast and wield such great influence. As we have seen
the states have the responsibility of conducting local, state
and national elections. The states thus prescribe the qualifications which the individual elector must possess in order
to vote. These requirements must stay within the Federal
Constitutional limitations. Women gained political equality
in 1920 with the passage of the 19th Amendment. Then there
was the matter of officers to be elected to the governments.
In the Federal Government the President, Vice-President,
Representatives and Senators had to be elected. In the states,
large groups of officers were elected both for the state and
local governments. For these numerous offices, the individual elector was faced with a different and difficult task of
choosing one candidate out of many. In come cases officers
were chosen from two or three hundred nominees. On the
same ballot there were usually from one to thifty technical
proposals for the electors' choice for proposed changes in
the governmental structure. It was impossible for each individual elector to be informed as to all the issues or qualifications of all the candidates. From a combination of all
these reasons, political parties arose. The need for a clearing house of information plus the necessity of educating the
individual elector brought about the growth of parties.
Where first there were small disunited groups of electors,
these above situations gave fertile grounds from which
strong, vastly organized parties sprang. And, because of
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these factors, political parties have made themselves felt.
Originally starting as voluntary organizations, they soon
swept the control of elections, nominations and policies of
government from the individual elector into party domination until now it is practically impossible to gain political
office without being a staunch member of one of the two
principal political parties.
The methods of the parties have thus become of great
importance to the life of the government itself. Today these
political parties are in reality no longer voluntary organizations, but by state action and legislation, they are virtually
organs of the government.
Before 1888 the parties printed the ballots used themselves, but so many abuses arose that after 1888, the states
adopted the Australian ballot and printed and controlled it
at state expense. This ballot listed all the candidates of one
party in a vertical row next to the respective offices. It allowed a "straight party vote." Another form of ballot which
was used was called the "Massachusetts ballot." Under this
form all the candidates are grouped under the respective officers, and "straight party voting" cannot be done.
Control over the ballot led to close party organization
regulations. Required expense accounts for money spent in
party nominations and elections for party committeemen has
been enacted by legislature. However, in spite of the abuses
and growing control over party affairs and methods, they
perform valuable functions. For through these organizations,
the voters are kept informed as to the issues of the elections.
They help get the qualified voters registered and they get
the people out to vote.
In spite of this growing control by the states, the political
parties are still run by professional politicians popularly referred to as "bosses." These men keep the organization running and give it life. Patronage and job-getting are still powerful weapons in the hands of these men, and they are used
to keep the members working for the party.
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Some states have endeavored to remove the political activities in the seeking of certain offices such as judgeships. This
has been tried by having nonpartisan elections where no
political party label is attached to the candidates. However, this attempt has not been very successful since the
party has methods of endorsing and backing certain candidates, particularly the ones who have either helped or
cultivated party friendship. With the general history of
political parties in mind, let us turn to a more detailed study
of the parties and the methods of nominations.
Since the parties have become so important in the affairs
and the life of the government itself and since the public
welfare is so greatly affected by their activities, many of the
states enacted regulatory acts to control these political parties. These acts were attacked as to their constitutionality
but the court in Britton v. Election Commissioners 109 held
that as long as these measures were reasonable, the legislatures were empowered to control the parties under the police
power of the state. The above view of the California court
is generally considered the accepted rule on this matter."'
Thus political parties are subject to reasonable governmental
control and regulation. Then in the case of State ex rel Webbev v. Felton .. the court of Ohio viewed the subject in the
light that it is within the constitutional powers of the legislature to prescribe reasonable regulations for a group of people
who organize for political purposes and who seek the privilege
and benefits of such a status under the election laws, and
that it is not unreasonable to prescribe that such groups in
order to gain this position must have polled a specified number of the total vote cast at the previous election.
Perhaps one of the most important functions of any
political party is to nominate and elect candidates of the
party to office. However, this function of nominating or se110

129 Cal. 337, 61 P. 1115 (1900).
18 Am. Jur. Sec. 132-145.
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77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N. E. 85 (1908).
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lecting candidates for local, state and national offices by
these groups was never provided for in the Federal constitution or in fact, in many of the state constitutions. Such a sitiation was not dreamed of by the constitution makers of the
18th century. But this selection process has become so important a function of political parties that the practice dominates and influences the very affairs and administrations of
the offices of the government. Recognizing this situation in
all its aspects some of the courts like Illinois in the case of
People ex rel Lindstrand v. Einmerson,11 2 have held that
party nominations are inseparable from a republican form
of government. In fact some feel that these political party
nomination processes are essential to a republican form of
government.
During the early history of our government, political parties were not strongly organized and candidates for office had
to build themselves up by their own efforts and the help of
their friends. However, the potential power of the vastness
of political organization was soon recognized, and since 1832
all presidential candidates have been nominated at the national party conventions. These party conventions were the
first undertakings to be used to select party candidates for
office.

Each year when a presidential election was to be held,
each political party held a national convention. At the gathering, party representatives chosen by the party organization of each state met to nominate candidates for the national offices. These representatives had been likewise chosen
at a state party convention which had nominated loyal party
followers for state offices. At the national convention such
business as forming a party platform, whipping up party interest, organizing the party forces for the election is performed. After this business was accomplished, the process
of choosing a nominee began. First there were nominations
112
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6D6, 165 N. E. 217 (1929). See also State ex rel LaFollette v.
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of different party personages. Then the convention delegates
voted as to which one of the various nominees would be their
choice for the party candidate at the general election for the
office of President and Vice-President of the United States.
When this was accomplished the convention led by its executive committee adjourned for the campaign fight.
The underlying principle behind these conventions was
the nominating process. But the whole structure of the conventions was built upon the idea of representation. In other
words, the party, through the democratic choice of delegates
of the party by its members, nominated candidates. This
function and principle behind the national convention was
exactly the same for the state party conventions. There were
many attempts to control the party conventions and their
organization, and many controversies arose concerning them.
The courts have usually declined to take part in the arguments holding that in the absence of express power, they
have no jurisdiction over the policies and organization of
the party conventions.
Many abuses arose in the convention system of nominations.
The control of certain "bosses" caused the convention system
to be torn from the hands of the individual party members.
Practices such as bribery and fraud were prevalent. As as result of these abuses, not only in the conventions but in the old
party caucuses, a movement grew to change the method of
nomination. This desire to correct the system and once again
to return the nominating processes to the individual party
members resulted in the adoption of primary election laws.
These primary elections were to be conducted by the state under the same care and supervision as the general elections
were carried out. Thus each party member could vote for his
nominee and have his vote count equally with all other party
members, and the candidates so nominated would be the
choice of the party members themselves. Thus as was pointed
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out in Kelso v. Cook ...the primary election meant, in fact,
.a choosing of candidates prior to the general election or an
antecedent choice in the primary before the final choice of
candidates in the final or regular election. The primary thus
became the initial step in choosing candidates who, as the result of such election, would take their places on the ballot
at the regular election. The purpose was to give the individual added guarantee of a free election; for the choice of
candidates for nominations is no less important than the
choice of candidates for the offices at the final election. It
should be noted here that when primary laws were established, only the process of nomination, since it was vested
with great public welfare, was regulated, and the control of
the state did not go beyond the nomination process of the
party to reach into the other party affairs.
As soon as these primary election laws were passed, grave
questions arose as to their validity. Generally, these acts
have been upheld by the courts." 4 Then as to Congressional
authority to regulate and control party primaries, it was held
in People ex rel Phillip v. Strasskeim "I that Congress had
no authority to regulate party primaries since this regulation of state primaries is properly the subject of state legislative control.
In providing for the holding of such elections it is within
the power of the state to call on and use the party machinery. The legislature of- the state may require that notice be
given and that the supervision of such elections be held under officers not chosen by the party.
In order to see the correct position of primary elections,
it is interesting to note that there is a conflict of authority
113 184 Ind. 173, 110 N. E. 987 (1916); see People ex rel Lindstrand v.
Emerson, 333 IIl. 606, 165 N. E. 217 (1929).
114
Primary Law upheld against the attack of invalid delegation of power
see State ex'rel McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N. D. 55, 118 N. W. 141 (1908), and held
not to violate the constitutional guarantee of freedom of election in Kelso v. Cook,
184 Ind. 172, 110 N. E. 987 (1916).
115 240 Ill. 279, 88 N. E. 821 (1909); see also State ex rel LaFollette v.
Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N. W. 895 (1930).
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as to whether constitutional or statutory provisions relating
to elections generally apply to primary elections. One group
of authorities hold that the laws relating to primary elections
do not apply to primary elections in the constitutional sense.
This was held in effect in Line v. Election Commissioners."' These authorities reason that since the primary
elections are mere substitutes for party conventions, they
are not intended to displace the party and are thus not under the constitutional and statutory principles of general
elections.
Another group of authorities hold that the right to nominate candidates whose names will go on the final election ballot is as important as the right to elect the candidates on the
final election. Both processes are of equal importance, and
thus the process of nomination by primary election must be
considered a vital part of the regular election law. In Britton
v. Election Commissioners 117 the court held that a statute
which regulated the method of nominations and the rights of
the voters in the party was a part of the general election law.
These latter authorities also base their view on the practical
ground that the party primary is equivalent to the final election since one party is so predominant in the state. This is
true in the South where the Democratic Party is the only rea'
party of strength. So when the primary election for the
Democratic Party is held in that section, the candidates
nominated are assured of election in the general election.118
It should also be noted here that in most primary elections
strict party lines are maintained. Only proven or qualified
Democrats can vote in the Democratic primary and the same
rule applies to Republican primaries. Under this situation the
party or the legislature can prescribe reasonable tests for the
proof of party qualifications. To what extent the party or
116 154 Mich. 329, 117 N. W. 730 (1908); Annotation in Ann. Cases, 1913 A,
702; 1918 E, 79.
117 129 Cal. 337, 61 P. 1115 (1900).
118 See Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N. E. 987 (1916).
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the legislature can go in prescribing qualifications becomes
of great importance where the question of discrimination
against negroes takes place, particularly in the Southern
states. This question will be dealt with in more detail a little
later.
Many interesting questions arise as to the construction
and applicability of these primary laws. The two views as to
whether primary elections are elections within the meaning
of the constitutional and statutory meanings or not must be
kept in mind here.
Where the provisions for primary elections are made compulsory these laws form a part of the general election law
of the state. 119 If this is the provision of the statute, this is
the one and only way a candidate can get his name placed on
the ballot. Under this view, the qualifications of the voter
for the primary cannot be different than those established in
the constitution for the regular election. 2 ° And in the case
of Spier v. Baker "2 the California court holding the above
view ruled that the residence requirement for primary elections could not be set at a shorter period than that time set
in the constitution for the general election. Then in the case
of State ex rel Webber v. Felton 122 the expenditure of public funds by the state for primary elections was upheld as expenditures for a public purpose on the grounds that such elections are not the private business of the parties, but are part
of the general election machinery.
Another view of construction applies in those states where
the primary laws either expressly or impliedly do not apply
to certain officers. For example in Kelso v. Cook 121 the statute authorized the nomination of United States Senators and
the Governor to be made in the primary, but the other state
officers were to be nominated at state conventions. The court
119
120
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122
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Britton v. Election Commrs., 129 Cal. 337, 61 P. 1115 (1900).
Johnson v. Grand Forks Co., 16 N. D. 363, 113 N. W. 1071 (1907).
120 Cal. 370, 52 P. 659 (1898).
77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N. E. 85 (1908).
184 Ind. 173, 110 N. E. 987 (1916).
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held that such an act was unconstitutional. Another form
which this view takes is where the legislature provides that
the primary law applies only to parties of a certain number. 12 ' As to the extent of qualifications under these jurisdictions the case of Kelso v. Cook 12 is typical. There it was
held that a statute which prescribed different qualifications
for voting in the primary than those required by the constitution for a general election was unconstitutional, since the
constitutional provisions relating to elections were not applicable to primaries. Then on the subject of expenses in
Waples v. Marrast126 the court of Texas held that public
money expended for primary election purposes was not a
fund for a public purpose and thus was unauthorized since
the primaries are nothing more than a private matter of the
political party.
Perhaps one of the most interesting questions which arises
under these two views of primary elections is the question
where discrimination is made against negroes to keep them
out of the primaries. Two famous cases, Nixon v. Condon '
and Nixon v. Hernden 28 on this subject held that where the
primary election is carried out as a governmental function,
qualifications cannot be based on race nor color, nor can
these factors be used as a base for disqualification in a primary election. A bit of historical background on the reasoning behind this subject is helpful. As we have seen, the early
nomination processes were controlled by the parties. However, when the legislature established primary elections, this
power passed from the parties and became vested in the
legislature. Thus by subsequent action, the legislature empowers the political party to determine the qualifications of
the members for the election, it is not an invalid delegation
of power since it amounts only to a regulation of power al124
125
126
127
128
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Waples v. Marrast, 108 Tex. 5, 184 S. W. 180 (1916).
Ind. 173, 110 N. E. 987 (1916).
Tex. 5, 184 S. W. 180 (1916).
U. S. 73, 76 L. Ed. 984 (1932).
U. S. 536, 71 L. Ed. 759 (1927).
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ready possessed by political parties. Under this development
the case of Grigsby v. iarris12 held that since the parties
were voluntary organizations, each one was free to select or
reject those persons whom it pleased for membership. However, this broad holding must be qualified. For when the exclusion is based on discrimination in violation of the 14th
and 15th Amendments, the exclusion is unconstitutional
where the primary election is considered a state function.
Whether the exclusion by the parties of certain classes of
people amounts to a violation of these constitutional provisions depends upon whether the action taken is under the
authority of the state or whether it is taken under party
action alone - the inherent power of the party to choose its
members until it is taken over by the state. Thus the test is
whether the holding of the primary election is a state function by the passage of an act which makes it so or whether
the power to choose members is left in the party outside of
the state control.
The Federal courts have used this as a basis for their decisions on the subject. They have also used the test as to
whether the expenses for the primary are borne by the state
or the party. If they are borne by the state, these courts consider that the primary election becomes part of the state
function and are under the prohibitions of the 14th and 15th
Amendments. However, if the party pays for the election,
then these constitutional amendments have no application
since they are not intended to apply to private individuals
in their actions. Thus under this latter test, party exclusions
of negroes is valid. With these reasons above in mind, it is
interesting to examine some of the Federal decisions on this
subject.
First, in Nixon v. Condon,"3 ° the court held that under the
Texas law where the political parties paid the expenses of the
129
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27 F. (2d) 942 (1928).
34 F. (2d) 464 (1929). This is reversed in 286 U. S. 73, 76 L. Ed. 984
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primary, and the state did not, the party was not an agency
of the state so that when the Democratic committee excluded negroes from the primary election, there was no violation
of the Federal Constitutional Amendments since they applied
only to state action. The case was appealed to the United
States Supreme Court and was reversed. The court held that
since Texas, after the declaration of the statute which expressly prohibited negroes from voting as void, had passed
another statute which gave the political parties the right to
define the qualifications of its own members, the second act
was a denial of the equal protection of the laws to negroes.
The court reasoned that since the State of Texas had taken
the authority to empower the political party to so define the
qualifications, it showed that the party did not have inherent
power to so define them in the first place. The court said:
"When those agencies are invested with an authority independent of the will of the association in whose name they
undertake to speak, they become to that extent the organs
of the state itself, the repositories of official power." Then
the court reversed the lower court and held the exclusion by
the political party void as discriminating against the negroes.
Then in the case of West v. Bliley ...the court held
that where the State of Virginia bore the expense of the
primary, the exclusion of negroes from the election by
the party pursuant to a statute authorizing that the party
define the qualifications of its members, was void as discriminatory, contrary to the Federal Constitution. The court
held that by authorizing the party to act as it did so as to
exclude negroes, the state had tried to do indirectly that
which it could not do directly; namely, discriminate on account of color. The fact that the state paid the expense of
the primary election made the election and its machinery a
1 2
state agency. 1
33 F. (2d) 177 (1929).
;See also Robinson v. Holman, 181 Ark. 428, 26 S. W. (2d) 66 (1930),
and Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28 S. W. (2d) 515 (1930). For other cases on
the subject of whether or not the exclusion of negroes by a political party is a
131
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On this subject a series of cases arising in Texas prove interesting. The first case which came up was Nixon v. Condon 1"I (supra). The legislature of this state after passing an
act to prohibit negroes from voting in primary elections and
having it declared void as discriminatory, passed another act
giving the party the right to determine qualifications of its
members for voting in the primary. The Supreme Court declared this attempt void and unconstitutional as a denial of
equal protection of the laws in the above mentioned case.
Then in 1935, the case of Grovey v. Townsend 1"4 was de-

cided. In this case the county clerk refused to grant a negro
an absentee ballot. The clerk was bound -by certain statutes
of Texas to perform only public duties of a clerical nature
with regard to primary elections. The State Convention of
the Democratic Party, by resolution, adopted a measure
which made only white citizens eligible for membership. In
view of this resolution the clerk refused the ballot. The Supreme Court declared that this action was not a violation
of the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Federal Constitution since it was not state action. The Democratic Convention had taken the action by its resolution, and the state had
nothing to do with it. This case was distinguished from Nixon
v. Condon (supra) in the fact that in the principal case the
action of exclusion was taken by the Democratic Convention
which was not a state agency, while in the Nixon case the
action was taken by the Democratic Executive Committee
pursuant to statute which conferred the right to so act on
that body. In the principal case the action was held not to
be taken by authority of the state but was voluntary party
action. In the Nixon case the action was taken under state
authority.
violation of the 14th and 15th amendments see White v. Lubbock, 30 S. W. (2d)
722 (1930); Waples v. Marrast, 108 Tex. 5, 184 S. W. 180 (1916); Bell v. -ill,
123 Tex. 531, 74 S. W. (2d) 113 (1934) holding that the exclusion of negroes from

the primary is lawful.
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286 U. S. 73, 76 L. Ed. 984 (1932).
295 U. S. 45, 79 L. Ed. 1292 (1935).
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Then in 1941 the case of United States v. Classic 135 arose
out of election frauds in the Louisiana Democratic primary.
In this election nominations were being made for representatives in Congress. The State of Louisiana paid the expenses
of the primary and had passed numerous laws which in effect made the primary an integral part of the state election
machinery. Because of these frauds by the officers of the
election, there was a prosecution under the Federal Criminal
Code.1" 6 The court held that the prosecutions were good under the Federal Code since Article 1, Section 4 of the United
States Constitution protected the electors right to vote for
Congressional officers in primary elections as well as general
elections where the primary election is conducted as a state
agency. Thus the power of Congress to regulate primary
elections as well as general elections where representation in
the Federal legislature is involved was recognized.
Then another case arose in Texas in 1940 which reached
the United States Supreme Court in 1944. This was the case
of Smith v. Allwright.3 7 The primary and general election
laws of Texas were exactly the same as they were in 1935
when Grovey v. Townsend (supra) was decided. In this case
a negro was denied the right to vote in the Democratic primary for the nomination of Congressmen as well as the state
officers. He brought suit for damages and the recovery was
denied on the strength of Grovey v. Townsend 18 (supra).
The Supreme Court heard the appeal and re-examined its
former decision on the grounds of the Constitutional principles involved. The court decided that the exclusion of the
negro from voting was discriminatory and a violation of the
14th and 15th Amendments since the primary election was
conducted basically as a state agency. Since the legislature
had placed the selection of candidates for public office whose
names -were finally to go on the official ballot in the political
135

313 U. S. 299, 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1941).
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See 18 U. S. C. A..Sec. 51, 52.
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64 Sup. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 701 (1944).
295 U. S. 45, 79 L. Ed. 1292 (1935).
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party, it had, by this action, made the primary election a
state function conducted under state authority. Thus the
party action of excluding the negro was subject to the 14th
and 15th Amendments of the Constitution since it was taken
in the primary conducted as a state instrumentality or
agency. This case thus directly overruled Grovey v. Townsend (supra). There was a vigorous dissent made to the
majority opinion of the court by Justice Roberts.
Thus this last case completed the view of the regulation of
primary elections as being included under the 14th and 15th
Amendments where federal candidates are being nominated.
There has been a great deal of criticism of this decision by
prominent members of the American Bar Association.13 9 It
is particularly under attack by the Democratic Party in
Texas which is presently engaged in a new process of finding a way around the decision in order to exclude negroes
from its primary. Needless to say more cases will arise in
Texas and elsewhere on this question. Now leaving this
question of discrimination and its effect in primary elections,
there are other interesting problems under. the subject of
primaries.
For example in the cases of People ex rel Lindstrand v.
Emmerson 140 the question of cumulative voting arose. A
statute of Illinois provided that the committee of a political
party could determine the number of candidates of their
party for representatives in the legislature, and each elector
of that party was given an equal voice in the primary as to
the number of candidates so determined. The statute in effect provided for cumulative voting on behalf of party primary electors. The court held that such a provision was not
unconstitutional and is violative of the guaranty that all
elections shall be free and equal. The court held that such a
statute was not an invalid delegation of power either.
139

140

Article, Chicago Tribune, September 15, 1944.
353 11. 606, 165 N. E. 247 (1929).
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Another question on primary elections arises when the
party establishes tests of party loyalty as to previously
known voting as a qualification. In the case of McLean v.
Fish ...the court held that as long as the states have made
no provisions as to these tests of party affiliations as a qualification, the party is free to prescribe such tests on the subject as they see fit. Then in the case of Friberg v. Scurry 142
the court held that the Democratic Party had no power to
deny an otherwise qualified voter from the primary because
he had previously voted for the Republican President. The
court held that they had no power because of a statute which
provided that no person could be denied the right to vote in
a primary because of his former political affiliation.
Another interesting problem is presented where people are
excluded from primary elections because they have failed to
comply with party enrollment requirements. In the case of
Brown v. Cole '" the court held that where the state has prescribed qualifications of voters for its primary election, the
party committee has no power to establish different qualifications by adopting a system of enrollment of voters for
the primary. 4 '
An interesting question arises as to the constitutional
rights of groups nominating candidates for public office outside of the regular primaries or conventions. The question
comes up because of the fact that state statutes providing
for primary elections usually limit the primary to parties of
a certain size.
141 159 Ark. 199, 251 S. W. 686 (1923); see also Ferguson v. Montgomery,
148 Ark. 83, 229 S. W. 30 (1920); Love v. Taylor, (Tex. Civ. App.) 8 S. W. (2d)
795 (1928); Clancy v. Clough, (Tex. Civ. App.) 30 S. W. (2d) 569 (1928); Lett
v. Dennis, 221 Ala. 432, 129 S. 33 (1930); White v. Co. Democratic Executive
Com., 60 F. (2d) 973 (1932).
142
(Tex. Civ. App.) 33 S. W. (2d) 743 (1930); see also Raymer v. Willi,
240 Ky. 634, 42 S. W. (2d) 918 (1931); Love v. Buckner, 121 Tex. 369, 49 S. W.
(2d) 425 (1932); State ex rel Hinrub v. Parish, 173 La. 857, 138 So. 826 (1931).
143 39 N. Y. C. P. R. 296, 104 N. Y. S. 109 (1907).
144 For exclusion because of refusal to pay party assessments see Montgomery
v. Chelf, 118 Ky. 766, 82 S.W. 388 (1904).
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If a party does not conform to the statutory size, it is left
to its own methods of nomination. The courts have usually
held that state statutes prescribing the minimum size of
parties eligible to take part in the primary are constitutional.
The only questions which give rise to litigation are the reasonableness or arbitrary nature of the standards set by the
14 5
statute.
A final problem under this section of primaries and political parties is the one of "nonpartisan ballots." The courts
have viewed these provisions favorably. Under this system
of elections certain officers are elected on ballots which do
not place party denominations on the candidates. In other
words, instead of the candidates running under party labels
for an office, no party designation is given, and the man runs
for the office on his own name. The reason for these "nonpartisan ballots" is to cut out "party politics" in certain elections. However, the aim of these acts is not always carried
out because the party can throw its weight behind certain
candidates on the nonpartisan ballot who are favorable and
friendly to the party. But the courts have held that such
provisions for a nonpartisan ballot for certain offices like
judgeships are constitutional.14
Thus we have seen generally the position of political parties and primary elections as a part of our electoral process,
together with the influence these institutions have on the individual elector. Next, let us examine briefly the restraints
put on parties and candidates as far as their actual conduct
for nominations and elections is concerned. This entails a
brief study of the so-called Corrupt Practice Acts.
145 Munsell v. Hennegan, .
Md.
,31 A. (2d) 640 (1943); Speckles v.
Graham, 194 Cal. 516, 228 P. 1040 (1924); Brown v. Election Commrs., 174 Mich.
477, 140 N. W. 642 (1913); State ex rel Harris v. Belote, 106 Fla. 938, 143 S. 881
(1932); Moore v. Walsh, 286 N. Y. 552, 37 N. E. (2d) 555 (1941); Nelson v.
Marsh, 123 Neb. 423, 243 N. W. 277 (1932).
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See Moon v. Halversen, 206 Minn. 331, 288 N. W. 579 (1939); Hoelsh v.

Girard, 54 Idaho 452, 33 P. (2d) 816 (1934); Sarles v. State, 201 Ind. 88, 166
N. E. 270 (1929) ; Ann. 67 A. L. R. 737, 125 A. L. R. 1044.
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V
CORRUPT PRACTICE ACTS.

In most of the states in this country, the legislatures are
bound to maintain the purity and integrity of elections. In
order to do this, the legislature must pass acts preventing
buying of votes, ballot box stuffing, false counting, and other
methods of contorting elections. The legislatures have acted
in this matter by passing Corrupt Practice Acts. These statutes usually regulate the expenses of candidates running for
election, and provisions are made whereby the candidate
must file an accounting for public inspection of the income,
contributions, and expenses which the candidate had for the
election. These acts go further and cover the matters of electioneering practices also. Some of the state statutes are
more comprehensive than others. But on the whole the courts
have viewed these acts favorably and have held them constitutional under the police power of the state.' 4 7
In order to give the full legislative intent to these acts, the
courts construe them liberally on the grounds that the legislature has broad power in the field of purity and integrity
of elections. Under these acts, some states have provided
that where a candidate has been guilty of "corrupt practices," he is disqualified from holding the office he sought.
In almost all of the states, however, a candidate who violates
the terms of these statutes is liable for criminal prosecution
and punishment." 8
The Federal Government has also enacted Federal Corrupt Practice Acts for the purity of elections where Federal
officers are concerned.' 4 9 However, in an act of 1911, the
Federal Government tried to enact a Corrupt Practice Act
which regulated the amount of money a candidate for Sena147 People v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357, 158 N. W. 195 (1916); State ex rel
LaFollette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N. W. 895 (1930).
148
People v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357, 158 N. W. 195 (1916); State v. Paris,
179 Ind. 446, 101 N. E. 497 (1913).
149 2 U. S. C. A. Sec. 241-256.
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tor or Representative could expend for the nomination in a
primary election. The Supreme Court in the famous case of
Newberry v. the United States 150 held that the act was unconstitutional. The court held that the power of Congress to
regulate "the manner of holding elections" was not broad
enough to include primary elections. However, as we have
seen this view has been changed, and the court has said that
Congress does have power under the above provision to
regulate primary elections where Federal officers are concerned. 15 ' After the Newberry case, Congress passed another
Corrupt Practice Act.' 52 This statute was upheld as constitutional in the case of Burroughs v. United States.'5 3 The
court held the act valid as far as Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections are concerned.
Turning from these Corrupt Practice Acts, let us return to
the individual elector and his right to vote and examine that
person's right to have his vote rendered in private and to
keep his choice secret.
VI
SECRECY OF VOTING.
Before 1884 the general practice in the United States was
to conduct elections by open and public voting. But the practice proved embarrassing and clumsy. Certain individuals
could, by their position, such as big employers, force others
to vote the way they wanted by the simple expediency of discharging the person who didn't vote according to the wishes
of the influential person. By open elections, a complete check
on the vote of each person would be kept. So to meet this
problem and to satisfy the need for a more workable system.
the states adopted the individual Australian Ballot. Under
this system, the individual elector marked an individual bal150 256 U. S. 232, 65 L. Ed. 913 (1921).
151 United States-v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1941).
152 2 U. S. C. A. Sec. 241-256.
153 290 U. S. 534, 78 L. Ed. 484 (1934).
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lot of his choice for office and dropped it into the ballot box.
There were no markings, names or similar identifications on
the ballot to tell of the election. The state paid the expenses
of the printing of these ballots. The idea of freedom had at
last flowed to the election proceedings as far as the electors
were concerned.
The people of the country had fought to gain their freedom and in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, had enumerated certain freedoms such as freedom of speech and religion which the government of the country could not deny.
However, until 1884, the freedom of the ballot had not been
provided for. The very fact that elections were the medium
by which the people controlled and chose their government
began to be recognized as the one basic way to enforce the
freedoms for which they had fought. So it became evident
that the unrestrained, uninfluenced right to vote in orderto
be properly exercised to gain the purpose, must be protected
by secrecy.
Many of the states recognize this situation and in order
to preserve the integrity of elections have provided in their
constitutions for the secrecy of voting. 154 In the states where
the constitution is not specific on the point, a split of authority develops as to whether the constitutional provision requiring that voting be done by ballot implies a requirement
of secrecy. The better reasoned view and the weight of authority holds that such secrecy is required.' 55 Michigan and
Pennsylvania have passed strict laws which are aimed directly at preserving and protecting the secrecy of the ballot. In
these two states as well as the others which protect this
secrecy, the laws prohibit marking the ballots for subsequent
154 Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 89, 10 Am. Rep. 97 (1871); Detroit v. Rush,
82 Mich. 532, 46 N. W. 951 (1890).
155 Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 89, 10 Am. Rep. 97 (1871); Detroit v. Inspector
of Elections, 139 Mich. 548, 102 N. W. 1029 (1905) ; also Alabama, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. Contra: State ex rel Plemmer
v. Posten, 59 Ohio St. 122, 52 N. E. 196 (1898).
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identification, exhibiting the contents of the ballot, and election officers from disclosing how a voter marked his ballot.
One of the interesting questions which is involved in this
problem of the secrecy of voting is whether an elector can be
required to disclose his choice in an election when he is testifying at a trial. Some of the cases decided on this point will
be interesting to examine.
In Glenn v. Snow 156 the court of Kentucky held that the
rule of privilege exempting a voter from testifying how he
voted in an election under a constitutional guarantee of
secrecy of the ballot, had no application where the person
was an illegal voter. The court also held that the rule of
privilege did not extend to primary elections even if the person was a legal voter since the constitutional guarantee of
secrecy of the ballot did not apply to primary elections.
It is generally held, however, in a regular election that a
legal and honest voter cannot be required to testify as to
which candidate he voted for. It is a privilege guaranteed
by the constitutional provisions protecting the secrecy of the
ballot. It is an outgrowth not only of the secret ballot which
we have in the United States, but also out of the desire to
preserve a purity of elections and an independent exercise
of the voting privilege.157 In the case of McArtor v. State15
the court of Indiana held that the secrecy extending to legal
voters in a regular election, extends also to absentee voters
and they cannot be required to testify as to which candidate
they voted for.
As we have seen in Glenn v. Gnau (supra) the privilege of
secrecy does not extend to an illegal voter, and he is not exempt from testifying for whom he cast his ballot.159 However,
156 251 Ky. 3, 64 S. W. (2d) 168 (1933).
157 Stevenson v. Barker, 347 Ill. 304, 179 N. E. 842 (1932); Gardner v.
School District, 248 Mich. 134, 226 N. W. 895 (1929); Annotation: 90 A. L. R.
1362.
158 196 Ind. 460, 148 N. E. 477 (1925).
159 See also Gardner v. School District, 248 Mich. 134; 226 N. W. 895;
Thompson v. Clarke, 254 Mich. 641, 236 N. W. 893 (1931); Robinson v. McAbee,
64 Cal. App. 709, 222 P. 871 (1923).
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it must be added that in some jurisdictions an illegal votei
can claim the privilege of not testifying as to the way he
voted on the grounds that he cannot be compelled to incriminate himself. 160
Since the right not to testify is a privilege, the question
of waiver arises. A legal voter can claim this privilege from
not testifying and thus gain his exemption, and it is also true
that since this privilege is personal to the voter, he can waive
the privilege personally just as when he claims it.1"' Then
on the question of an illegal voter and waiver, the court in
Gardner v. School District 162 held that if a voter voluntarily
admits the illegality of his vote he is deemed to have waived
his right of refusing to testify because of self-incrimination,
and the witness will be required to testify as to how he voted
in the election.
Next let us turn to the important question of absentee
voting. This is an important provision as far as the individual
elector is concerned, and especially during the time of this
present war since so many voters are away in military service.
VII
ABSENTEE VOTING AND VOTING

By PERSONS

IN MILITARY SERVICE.

The problem of absentee voting arises where qualified
electors are absent from their voting precinct on the day of
election due to some necessity. There is a problem as to how
these people can vote without appearing personally at the
polls. This situation has been greatly enlarged by the fact
160 Stevenson v. Barker, 347 Il. 304, 179 N. E. 847 (1932); Scholl v. Bell,
125 Ky. 750, 102 S. W. 248 (1907). For the necessary evidence before requiring
an illegal voter to ,testify as to his choice see Montoya v. Ortez, 24 N. M. 616, 175
P. 335 (1918).
161 State ex rel Hutchins v. Tucker, 106 Fla. 905, 143 S. 754 (1932); Stevenson v. Barker, 347 Ill. 304, 179 N. E. 842 (1932).
162 248 Mich. 134, 220 N. W. 895 (1929).
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that during the present war, many of the young, qualified
electors are absent from their voting districts. To meet this
situation many states have passed Absentee Voters' Laws.
In some of the states the acts were limited to cases of military men only, while in other states the privilege of voting
by absentee ballot has been extended to all electors who for
various specific reasons are unable to vote on election day in
person.
Generally under these acts certain specific reasons are set
out which are the basis for the voters' absence from the polls
on election days. If the voter cannot appear in person to cast
his ballot because of one of these reasons, such as sickness,
urgent business, and state or Federal business, he can apply
for an absentee ballot. There are usually regularly established forms which can be made out for this application. It
must be filed within a specified period in order to obtain a
ballot. If the voter's qualifications measure up to the standards, and he comes under one of the absentee voter's reasons
as set out in the statute, a special absentee voter's ballot is
given or mailed to him. This ballot contains the regular lists
of candidates. Usually it must be filled in and sealed before
some officer able to administer oaths. The ballot thus sealed
is mailed back to the voter's precinct so that it will arrive
within a certain period of time around the general election
day. Upon complying with all of these requirements, the absent voter thus has his vote counted in the general election
just as if he had personally cast it at the polls.
Of course these acts were subjected to many attacks as to
their constitutionality. Of course no. question arises on this
subject where the constitution of the particular state expressly authorized the legislature thereof to enact such laws26 3
Under this situation the only questions for litigation revolve
around the reasonableness and extent the legislature went in
their enactments. The real issues arose on this subject where
163

See 35 A. L. R. 815.
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the state constitutions did not expressly provide for this situation.
Many of the early absentee voters' laws were declared unconstitutional as far as state officers were concerned since
many of the state constitutions expressly provided for the
elector's residence, and the time and place of holding the
election. These provisions were made specific as qualifications for the exercise of the voting franchise. Where they
were specifically provided for in the constitution, the legislature could not change these requirements. However, as far as
the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections were concerned, these absentee voters' laws were declared valid since
the Federal Constitution, Article 2, Section 1, provides that
each state shall appoint electors for the President and VicePresident in such manner as the legislatures thereof may
direct.' This was in effect held in People ex rel Twitchell v.
Blodgett 165 where the Michigan court held the absentee
voters' act unconstitutional as to the state election of state
officers, but constitutional as far as Representatives in Congress was concerned, because the Federal Constitution, Article 1, Section 4, provided that the time, place and manner
of holding the elections for Senators and Representatives
shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof.
No general rule can be made for the earlier decisions on
this subject of absentee voter laws since it always depended
on whether the state constitutions were specific as to the
time, place and manner of conducting the elections. If the
constitutions were specific as to these requirements, the legislatures were deemed to be forbidden to change these provisions by the enactment of absentee voters' laws. 66 In the
164 See Re vote of Soldiers in Military Service, 27 Pa. Dist. Rep. 10 (1917);
14 A. L. R. 1256.
165 13 Mich. 127 (1865).
166 Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161 (1864); act held unconstitutional because of the residence requirement of the California constitution. In 1922 the California constitution was amended to provide for absentee voting laws. Chase v.
Miller, 41 P. 403 (1862), act declared unconstitutional as repugnant to the residence
requirement of ,the constitution. Opinion of Judges, 30 Conn. 591 (1862), act un-
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case of Clark v. Lyons 167 another ground for declaring these

acts unconstitutional was found. The court of Kentucky declared the absentee voters' act invalid on the ground that it
violated the constitutional guarantee of the secrecy of the
ballot.
However, if the constitutions of the states did not contain
specific provisions as to the time, place and manner of conducting elections and the legislatures were given authority,
either expressly or impliedly, to fill in the general requirements as set forth in the constitutibn, the legislatures were
thus free to enact laws prescribing the qualifications or the
manner of conducting elections. Under these conditions the
absentee voters' laws were upheld.16 This same distinction
is the basis for the decisions on the subject today. One of the
many interesting cases on this subject is Jenkins v. State
Board of Elections.6 ' In this case the court held that although a constitutional provision that elections shall be by
ballot means a secret ballot, the voter may waive the provision and mail his ballot to the election officials to be deposited in the box by them. And further, that the provision
that every person offering to vote shall he a legal resident of
the election district, does not require his personal presence in
the district where the offer is made, but it may be made in
writing.
The same questions as to the constitutionality of the absentee military voters' laws are presented as were found
constitutional as violative of the constitutional requirements of the manner of conducting elections. Re Contested Elections, 281 Pa. 131, 126 A. 199 (1924), act unconstitutional as violative of the constitutional provision as to residence. State v.
Lyons, I Terry 40 Del. 77, 5 A. (2d) 495 (1939).
167 192 Ky. 594, 234 S. W. 1 (1921).
168 Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa 304 (1863); Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio
St. 573 (1863); State ex tel Chandler v. Main, 16 Wis. 398 (1863); For special
elections see Goodell v. Judith Basin Co., 70 Mont. 222, 224 P. 1110 (1924) ; Jones
v. Smith, 165 Ark. 425, 264 S. W. 950 (1924); Gleck v. Hunter, 190 Ind. 51, 129
N. E. 232 (1920) ; as to the construction and effect of Absentee Voters' Act, State
ex rel Whitley v. Rinehart, 140 Fla. 654, 192 S. 819 (1940) ; absentee's presense at
polls on election day, not rendering vote cast by absentee ballot illegal: McCardle
v. Holcomb, 216 Ind. 267, 23 N. E. (.2d) 470 (1939); Burke v. State Bd. of Canvassers, 152 Kan. 826, 107 P. (2d) 773 (1940).
169 180 N. C. 169, 104 S. E.'346 (1920).
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above under the regular absentee voters' acts. The problem
for the courts to determine is whether the state constitution has so fully defined the time, place and manner of holding the election as to preclude and prevent the legislature
from passing statutes allowing a different method of voting
as to the time, place and manner under the situation of persons in the military service. For example, in the case of Re
Lancaster City's Fifth Ward Election 1o the court held that
the legislature of a state cannot provide for general absentee
voting where the constitution provides that the elector shall
have resided in the district "where he shall offer to vote" a
specified period of time preceding the election and provide
a special provision for absentee soldiers' vote.
Most of the soldier voting laws which were passed before
the Civil War were declared unconstitutional as far as state
officers were concerned because of some constitutional provision which conflicted with them. However, these same laws
were upheld as to electors of the President and Vice-President."'
Several of the military absentee voters' laws were attacked
on the ground that they were class legislation and thus void.
However, the courts of Ohio 172 and Wisconsin "I held this
contention was not true since the acts were limited in their
application to military personnel in the service of the state
or the United States. Missouri enacted a broader absentee
voters' law which was attacked on the same grounds. But the
court in Straugkam v. Meyers" 4 held that the act was unconstitutional since it applied equally to all persons who were
unavoidably out of the county on business.
In the opinion of the Rhode Island court in Opinion of the
Justices ...the constitution provided that electors vho were
170 281 Pa. 131, 126 A. 199 (1924).
171 See annotations, 14 A. L. Rt 1257; 19 A. L. R. 308; 35 A. L. R. 819.
172 fLehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573 (1863).
178 State ex rel Chandler v. Main, 16 Wis. 398 (1863).
174 268 Mo. 580, 187 S. W. 1157 (1916).
175

....

R.

. ......
,25 A. (2d) 360 (1942).
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otherwise qualified to vote except being absent from the
state, shall have the right to vote and further that the assembly may provide special regulations in the manner of
voting for persons in the actual military service of the United
States. The court was of the opinion that the provisions did
not confer on the persons in the military service the right to
vote for officers not specifically enumerated in the constitution for such absentee voting. The court was of the further
opinion that the assembly could provide for the registration
of those in military service since the constitution had conferred such power on that body.
It should be remembered on this topic that generally a
person who is in the military service is not disqualified ipso
facto from voting unless the constitution specifically prohibits them from voting. This view was taken in People ex
rel Orman v. Riley. 76 In the case of Dirst v. McDonald 177
the court of Illinois held that residence for voting is neither
gained nor lost by the prelence of a person in a particular
place because of military duty or being absent from his regular residence in the scope of his military duties.
Then in the case of Taylor v. Reading 178 the court held

that a soldier did not gain a voting residence in the locality
by the mere fact that he was stationed there. In New York
the court held in Re Cunningham ' that the intention of
the person in the military service will determine whether or
not he has gained or lost his voting residence. Then in the
case of In re Right of Electors 180 the court construed the

amendment to the Rhode Island Constitution providing for
voting by persons absent in the military service broadly to
include all persons who were absent while engaged in the
176 15 Cal. 48 (1860); Hunt v. Richards, 4 Kan. 549 (1868); but for constitutional provisions preventing military personnel from voting see: Savage v. Umphries, (Tex. Civ. App.) 118 S. W. 893 (1909); State ex rel Simon v. Moorhead,
102 Neb. 276, 176 N. W. 70 (1918).
177 372 I1. 498, 24 N. E. (2d) 361 (1939).
178 4 Brewst (Pa.) 439 (1870).
179 91 N. Y. S. 974 (1904).
180 41 R. I. 118, 102 A. 9f3 (1918).
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prosecution of the war. The court used the term "military
establishment of the United States" to cover the scope of its
decision. 8 '
Let us next examine some of the recent decisions on this
subject which have arisen during the present war. In the case
of Rentz v. Gauney 182 the court held that the statute requiring the election inspectors to leave on the registration
lists all those who voted at the last general election except
those who have ceased to be voters in the district, did not apply to persons in the United States Marines, and that the person's name should be left on the list. Then in State ex rel
Walker v. Harrington183 the court declared unconstitutional
a statute which provided that persons in military service
could vote at the polling place at their encampment or a convenient encampment since it was an unreasonable restriction
on the right of challenge, departed from the prescribed election procedure and frustrated the power of the court sitting
as a board of canvass.
84 the statute required
In the case of Gregory v. Sanders .
the candidates to pay a fee for having his name placed on
the ballot. The ballots with one of the candidate's names
printed on it were mailed to absent soldiers for voting purposes. The candidate failed to pay the fee. The court held
that the absentee soldiers' votes should be counted regardless of the candidates' failure to comply with the statute even
though the candidates' failure to pay the fee required a new
printing of the ballots for local use. The court held that the
statute must be construed in the light of the circumstances
of the case so as not to frustrate the intention of the ab181 For the construction and interpretation of these absentee voters' laws see:
People ex rel Brush v. Schum, 168 N. Y. S. 391, (1917) ; statute construed liberally:
People ex rel Colne v. Smith, 176 N. Y. S. 608 (1919); Re Zierbel, 169 N. Y. S
270 (1918); Vote of Soldiers in Military Service, 27 Pa. Dist. R. 10 (1917); see
140 A. L. R. 1110 for complete annotation for Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Nebraska,
Indiana, Kentucky, and North Carolina.
182 179 Mass. 156, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 289 (1942).
183
184

30 A. (2d) 688 (1943).
......
Del .......
...... Miss ....... 15 S. (2d) 432 (1943).
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sentee soldiers' voting acts. Since the statute did not declare
such a violation as a forfeiture of the soldiers' ballots because of the necessity of printing new ones, the court would
construe the statute as merely directory rather than man85
datory."
Next, in the case of Richardson v. Radics ' the court held
that a person who was in the military service but who had not
registered according to the statute was not eligible to vote
under the constitutional provision that no "elector" should
be deprived of his right to vote because of his absence from
the election district due to military service. The court held
that "elector" meant "qualified elector" and a person who
had not registered was not a "qualified elector." Finally, in
the opinion of the court in Re Opinion of Justices "87 the

court was of the opinion that the legislature could not empower the Governor to advance the date of the primary election so as to let military personnel vote in the coming general election since the grant was so broad and undefined as to
render it unconstitutional as an invalid delegation of power.
Thus it can be seen that the scope, application and effect
of absentee voters' laws, both general and for military persons, depends upon the scope of the constitutional provisions
and the construction of the state statutes. In the case of Absentee Soldier Voters' laws, particularly, these two problems
of construction are felt. No definite rule can be advanced
which will serve as a test which will assure a person in the
military service that he will be able to vote. Because of this
situation; there was a great deal of agitation to provide definitely that all such people should 'be able to vote in the 1944
Presidential election. This feeling gained such strength that
the Congress of the United States passed legislation which
attempts to provide an opportunity for each person in the
185 On
New Jersey
hay ....... N.
186 ......
187 ......

the question of the construction of the registration requirement of the
statute with regard to absentee soldiers' registration, see: In Re DonaJ...
34 A. (2d) 299 (1943).
N. J ........ 35 A. (2d) 425 (1943).
Mass.., 2 N.,E. (2d) 974 (1943).
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military service of the country who is a qualified voter to
vote. An examination of the Federal Act will be both informative and interesting.
VI1
FEDERAL SOLDIERS' VOTE ACT.
As we have seen in the preceding section, the people in
military service are under a handicap in the exercise of their
right to vote. By being absent from their districts on election
day, they are not able to vote in person. Where provisions for
absentee balloting are attempted by the legislatures to remedy this situation, constitutional hurdles such as residence,
registration, poll tax, and place of holding elections must be
overcome. Because of failure to comply with all of these requirements, many military personnel are deprived of their
right to vote.
The present war has greatly magnified this situation, since
there are many more qualified electors engaged in the conflict. Grave concern arose over the fact that around 11,000,000 members of the armed forces of the country would lose
their right to vote. It is practically impossible for this group
of people to comply with the different requirements of the
forty-eight states. For example, the statutes of four states do
not provide for absentee voting at all. 88 In eleven states
registration is required before an absentee can vote.' 8 9 In
most of the states the procedure necessary in order to obtain
absentee ballots is so complicated and time consuming that
military personnel do not have the means nor the time to
comply with them. Then the fact that these people are
spread out all over the world makes it impossible for them
to get all the necessary applications and the final ballot back
to their districts in time for the election. The space of time
between the primaries where the candidates are nominated
188 President Roosevelt's message to Congress, Jan. 26, 1944, 20 Cong. Record
752.
189 Ibid.
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and the general election is so short that the names of the
candidates cannot be sent to the absentees in time. The only
remedy for this situation is in the centralization of all these
voting procedures into a swift workable plan which would
coordinate all the different state voting laws. This was just
what Congress did in 1942.
In that year Congress passed an act ...which provided for
a federal ballot to be prepared by the states. It further cut
out or limited state requirements as to registration, payment
of poll tax, and other time consuming procedures as far as
military personnel was concerned. Provisions were made
whereby these people could, by post card, furnished by the
Federal Government, request a federal ballot from their respective states. This act in effect provided for absentee voting in the states which had none and also eliminated many
state requirements under their voting procedures. Still few
service forces were able to take advantage of the provisions
of the Federal Act because the ballots could not be sent out
until after the candidates had been nominated in the primaries. Thus there was not enough time between the nominations and the general election to get the ballots printed, sent
to the armed forces, and receive them back for recording in
the general election returns. President Roosevelt's message
to Congress in January of 1944 conveyed this picture of the
situation of absentee military voting. As a result of this, Congress on April 1, 1944 passed a new absentee military voters'
act.191 The act provided only for the right to vote for the
Presidency, the Vice-Presidency and Congressmen. A summary of the act is extremely interesting.
Section 303 192 provides that the act shall not limit the

right to vote of any person in the military service or any other person to vote according to the laws of his resident state.
190
191
192

Public Law 712, 56 Statute 753.
58 Statutes 136, 50 U. S. C. A. Sec. 301-354.
50 U. S. C. A. Sec. 301-354.
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Section 321 sets out the purpose of the act, namely, that
Congress recommends that the states pass appropriate legislation to allow people serving in and attached to the armed
forces who are absent from their voting districts to vote by
absentee ballots for Federal, State and local officers in both
primary and general elections.
In Section 322, Congress recommends that the states waive
their registration requirements and empower their election
officials to send out absentee ballots to the voters in the
armed service. It is further recommended that where the
registration requirement is not waived, that the states should
allow and accept the absentee voters' post card application
as both an application for registration and a request for a
ballot.
The people included under the provisions of the act are as
follows: "Every voter serving in the armed forces of the
United States or in the Merchant Marine of the United
States, or serving in the American Red Cross, the Society of
Friends, the Women's Auxiliary Service, Pilots of the United
States Organizations and attached to and serving with the
armed forces of the United States." 19
Then Section 323 provides for the printing of these post
card applications for absentee ballots. The form of the card
is set out in the statute. This section again stresses the favoring of Congress that these post cards be used by the states
for applications for ballots for the state and local elections.
This section provides that the War Ballot Commission,...
made up of the Secretaries of War and Navy and the Administrator of the War Shipping Administration, should send
these post cards to the voters in the armed forces. Whether
the post cards are allowable by the states for their own elections or not, these cards are to be used by the military voters
in securing their ballots for any general, election where the
195 Section 322 - for a complete listing of people eligible under the act both
outside of and inside of the United States.
194 Provided for and established in Subchapter III, Sec. 331.
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electors for the Presidency, Vice-Presidency, or Congressmen
are to be voted upon. These cards must be delivered to the
absentee military voters by certain dates: i.e. by August 15th
if the voter is outside of the United States and by September
15th if inside the United States.
Then by Sections 325 and 326, the Commission must gather information as to the holding of the different state elections and transmit this data to the armed forces' voters. This
Commission must aid and expedite the sending of both the
applications and the ballots themselves between the voter
and the states. Section 327 provides for the distribution of
the ballots; the designation of ballot envelopes and instructions, a recommendation of the states' extension of the time
limit as to the mailing of ballots before the election, a recommendation to the state to waive registration requirements for
absentee voters included under this act, and finally a recommendation to the states to reduce the size and weight of absentee voters' materials in order to expedite transportation.
Subsection III provides for the establishment of the War
Ballot Commission and establishes the form of the Federal
Ballot. This ballot is to be used where the governor of the
state of the voter has certified that no procedure for absentee voting has been made to grant absentee ballots to
voters in the armed forces, or where the state law has adopted the use of the Federal ballot, or when the governor of
the voter's state has made neither of the above certifications
but the voter makes an oath that he has applied for a state
ballot but has not received it by October 1. If any of these
four situations exist and the person is in the classification of
persons under the act, the Federal Ballot can be used.
The Federal Ballot provides for the voting by writing in
the name of the candidates for the President, Vice-President,
Senator and Representatives in Congress from the voter's
district and Representatives-at-Large. Then the ballot goes
on and provides for a form of an oath to be taken by the
voter as to his qualifications under this act. This oath is
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printed on the "official inner" envelope which contains the
ballot. This "inner" envelope is placed in an "official outer"
envelope and sealed after the voter has exercised his vote.
Then in Section 336 it is provided that the War Ballot
Commission shall compile the lists of candidates and their
political parties from the respective states for President and
Vice-President or for Senators and Representatives in Congress. These lists, whether complete or not, will be transmitted by the Commission all over the world where voters are
located who are under the act. Sections 337 and 338 provide
for the distribution and collection of the ballots of the members of the armed forces and others and of the merchant
marine. Then Section 339 provides for the transmission of
the marked ballots back to the United States and thence to
the respective states. Section 340 provides for reports by the
respective states as to the receipt of these ballots.
In Section 341 the validity of the Federal Ballots is provided for. There are three situations which will render such
a ballot void: (1) If the voter has voted in person at the
polls or has voted by means of the procedure of absentee
voting in his state; (2) If the oath of the voter on the Federal Ballot is later than the date of the holding of the election; and (3) if the Federal Ballot is received later than the
closing time of the polls on the election day, except where
there is a state provision for an extension of time for receiving absentee ballots which is made applicable to the Federal
Ballots.
Section 343 provides for the application of the laws prohibiting offenses against the voting franchise to the cases of
voting done under this act. In Section 344 the taking of
"polls," i.e. requests for information as to the manner or
choice of the elector on his ballot, is forbidden. These are the
main sections of this important act.
Thus this act provides for a new, quick method of absentee
voting for the election of federal officers by voters of the
service branches engaged in the fighting of the war. Form
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ballots, lists of candidates, and transmission of the ballots is
provided for to gain speed and ease in allowing these persons
to exercise their voting privilege. Under this act the states
are free to determine for themselves whether or not the voters under the act are qualified to vote under the laws of the
states. The counting of the ballots is left to the state. The
act makes two inroads on the state's power over elections.
First the state requirements as to the registration for voters
are abolished insofar as they concern absentee voters who
are under the act. Secondly, the state requirement for the
payment of poll tax is suspended for these persons. These inroads are made on the states' power over elections only in
the case of the election for the President, Vice-President,
1 5
or Senators and Representatives in Congress. 9
The act makes no provision for the voting of these persons
insofar as state and local elections are concerned. It is on this
fact that the grounds for Congress' power to pass such a law
can be seen. As has been seen before, Congress, under Article
1, Section 4 of the Constitution, has power to change any of
the state regulations as to the "time, place and manner of
holding elections for Senators and Representatives in Congress." This act as far as Congressional control of elections
is concerned is based on this provision. But the power of Congress to so provide the same procedure for the election of the
President and Vice-President is not so clear and has no express constitutional authority. Thus it is questionable whether Congress has the power to change the state law as to registration and the payment of poll tax as state qualifications
for voters is concerned in Presidential and Vice-Presidential
elections.
The reason that Congress made no attempt to apply the
provisions of this act to state or local elections is the fact
that Congress has no power, either expressed or implied, to
interfere with the states on this matter. To have done so
195
752.

President Roosevelt's message to Congress, Jan. 26, 1944, 20 Cong. Record
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would have resulted in an unconstitutional act. But this body
has extended itself into the field of thd states' power over
elections on the above constitutional power. Whether the
action is valid as far as Presidential and Vice-Presidential
elections are concerned remains to be seen. But it would appear that Congress has overstepped its legal and constitutional authority in this matter. The purpose of the act is
laudable, but from a strict constitutional viewpoint, it is
rather doubtful. Thus we have seen the latest development
in the field of absentee voting.
We have examined the privilege of voting in this country.
The development of this right is the one potent factor in
maintaining our country the great nation it is today. On each
individual elector rests the obligation, nay, the absolute duty,
to exercise this privilege with intelligence and resolution. An
understanding of the voting franchise is the first step toward
the intelligent use of the right. To that end and goal, this
study is humbly dedicated.
Charles M. Boynton.

